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THE RHETORIC OF MODERATION: 
DESEGREGATING THE SOUTH DURING 
THE DECADE AFTER BROWN 
Davison M. Douglas* 
The choice is not between segregation and integration; it is between 
some integration and total integration. . . . [If we resist all integration], it 
is a foregone conclusion that the winner will be total integration, or that 
the schools will be closed. . . . Token integration ... will save the state 
and save the schools. . . . This is moderation. 
-North Carolina State Judge Braxton Craven, 19601 
J. INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the South's2 massive resistance to the Supreme 
Court's Brown v. Board of Education3 decision has fascinated schol-
ars. 4 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision striking down 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, William and Mary. A.B., 
Princeton University; J.D., Ph.D., Yale University. I would like to thank Neal Devins, Mary 
Dudziak, William Link, James Paul, Russell Pearce, and Eric Stein for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank my research assistants Erin Hawkins, Fred 
Jacob, and Manesh Rath. 
1 Braxton Craven, Legal and Moral Aspects of the Lunch Counter Protests, CHAPEL HILL 
WKLY., Apr. 28, 1960, at lB (emphasis added). 
2 Unless otherwise noted, for purposes of this Article references to the "South" include the 
eleven states of the old Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 
3 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
4 See, e.g., NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS 
IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969); JAMES W. ELY, THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIR-
GINIA: THE BYRD ORGANIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1976); ROBIN L. 
GATES, THE MAKING OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: VIRGINIA'S POLITICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION, 1954-1956 (1962); BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF 
INTEGRATION SINCE THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION (1964); BENJAMIN MuSE, VIR-
GINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1961); REED SARRATT, THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION: THE 
FIRST DECADE (1966); FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1973); J. 
HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME CoURT AND SCHOOL INTE-
GRATION: 1954-1978 (1979); Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Pro-
gress and Prospects, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 193 (1964); Walter Gellhorn, A Decade of 
Desegregation-Retrospect and Prospect, 9 UTAH L. REv. j (1964); Robert B. McKay, "With All 
Deliberate Speed": Legislative Reaction and Judicial Development 1956-1957, 43 VA. L. REv. 
1205 (1957); Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": A Study of School Desegregation, 
31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1956); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School 
Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485 (1978); Note, The Federal 
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school segregation, more than half of the states of the old Confeder-
acy-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Virginia-defied the Court by denying the legitimacy of the Brown 
decision and doing all that they could to resist its implementation; two 
other southern states-Arkansas and Florida-also engaged in some 
defiance of the Court, although they allowed pupil mixing in at least a 
few of their schools without a court order to do so. Each of these 
states enacted an interposition resolution claiming the Brown decision 
to be illegitimate and unworthy of compliance;5 each also enacted sub-
stantial legislation aimed at thwarting efforts to integrate schools 
within their borders.6 And, at least in the short term, this defiance 
Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (1962). 
5 Interposition and Nullification-Alabama, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 437 (1956) Goint resolu-
tion declaring Brown decision "null and void"); Interposition and Nullification-Arkansas, 1 
RAcE REL. L. REP. 1116 (1956) (constitutional amendment approved by voters); Interposition 
and Nullification-Florida, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 707 (1957) Goint resolution); Interposition-
Louisiana, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 753 (1956) Goint resolution); Interposition and Nullification-
Mississippi, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 440 (1956) Goint resolution); Interposition and Nullification-
South Carolina, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 443 (1956) Goint resolution); Interposition and Nullifica-
tion-Virginia, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 445 (1956) Goint resolution). 
The legislatures of Texas and North Carolina did not adopt an interposition resolution. The 
Tennessee House of Representatives adopted an interposition resolution, but it was not ratified 
by the Senate. Interposition and Nullification-Tennessee, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 228 (1957). 
6 The following are examples of some of this legislation. Public Schools-Alabama, 1 RAcE 
REL. L. REP. 717 (1956) (discussing Act No. 117, Apr. 14, 1956 which required local school 
boards to provide segregated schools for those parents who want them); Public Schools-Arkan-
sas, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 453 (1957) (discussing Act No. 84, Feb. 26, 1957 which eliminated 
compulsory attendance law where attendance in a racially mixed school is required); Public 
Schools-Arkansas, 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 390 (1959) (discussing Act No. 151, Mar. 3, 1959 which 
provided for payment of tuition to private schools for students assigned to integrated schools); 
Public Schools-Florida, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1149 (1957) (discussing Chapter 1975 of the 1957 
Acts, Oct. 25, 1957 which provided for closing of schools when federal military forces are em-
ployed near a school); Compulsory Attendance-Florida, 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 753 (1959) (dis-
cussing Chapter 59-412, June 19, 1959 which eliminated compulsory attendance law where 
attendance in a racially mixed school is required); Public Schools-Georgia, 1 RAcE REL. L. 
REP. 418 (1956) (discussing Act No. 11, Feb. 6, 1956 which granted the Governor discretion to 
close local schools); School Closing-Georgia, 4 RAcE REL. L. REP. 181 (1959) (discussing Act 
No.7, Feb. 3, 1959 which authorized tuition grants when schools are closed); Public Schools-
Louisiana, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 239 (1956) (discussing Act 555, 1954 which provided that opera-
tion of integrated school violates criminal code); Public Schools-Louisiana, 1 RACE REL. L. 
REP. 728 (1956) (discussing House Bill No. 438, June 21, 1956 which eliminated compulsory 
attendance law for integrated schools); Public Schools-Mississippi, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 422 
(1956) (discussing House Bill No. 31, Feb. 24, 1956 which repealed requirement of compulsory 
education); Public Schools-Mississippi, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 480 (1957) (discussing Chapter 
254, 1956 which prohibited any state official from attempting to integrate the schools); Public 
Schools-South Carolina, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 241 (1956) (discussing Acts of 1955 which elimi-
nated funding for any school to which a student had been transferred under court order); Public 
Schools-Virginia, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1091 (1956) (discussing Chapter 56, 71, Sept. 29, 1956 
which mandated cutoff of state funds to school districts with integrated schools and contained a 
provision for tuition grants to those students whose public schools are closed). 
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succeeded. On the fifth anniversary of the Brown decision, no black 
child had ever attended school with white children in any of these 
defiant states with the limited exceptions of Virginia and Arkansas. 
On the tenth anniversary of Brown, still no black child in Mississippi 
had ever attended school with white children and only a handful of 
black children in the other defiant states had gained entry into a white 
schooJ.7 Much of the scholarship of the post-Brown era has attempted 
to explain this massive resistance and to speculate on the reasons for 
its success.s 
However, not every southern state pursued a strategy of com-
plete resistance to the Brown decision. Scholars have paid less atten-
tion to those few southern states that engaged in token integration 
during the first few years after Brown. The white political leaders in 
these "moderate" states-primarily North Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Texas-appeared to accept, at least in principle, the Brown decision's 
legitimacy while seeking to avoid its reach.9 
7 SoUTHERN EDuc. REPoRTING SERV., STATISTICAL SuMMARY OF ScHOOL SEGREGATION-
DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 27, 29 (1965). 
8 See generally BARTLEY, supra note 4; MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4; WIL-
HOIT, supra note 4; WILKINSON, supra note 4; JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEw AMERICAN 
DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ScHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984). 
Much of this scholarship has focused on the role of the Supreme Court in this process. 
Some scholars have laid part of the blame for the success of massive resistance at the feet of the 
Supreme Court for its refusal to confront the resistance to its mandate in Brown in a meaningful 
way. STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN EXPLO-
RATION OF SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES (1977); WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 78-79. More re-
cently, at least two scholars have argued that the successful resistance to Brown demonstrates 
the comparative insignificance of the courts in fostering racial change in this country as com-
pared to the legislative and executive branches of government. GERALD N. RosENBERG, THE 
HoLLow HoPE: CAN CouRTS BRING ABoUT SociAL CHANGE? (1991); Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, SO VA. L. REv. 7 (1994). 
9 BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 144; WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 78-79. This distinction be-
tween "moderate" and "defiant" states is admittedly somewhat simplistic. Political leaders in all 
11 southern states opposed pupil mixing; they differed, however, in the extent to which they 
were willing to go to preserve segregated schools. 
As a general rule, the defiant states placed no limitations on their willingness to resist the 
Brown decision whereas political leaders in the moderate states were willing at least to some 
modest extent to balance their desire to avoid all pupil mixing with other concerns. Yet within 
all of the moderate states, there were those who favored resistance to the Brown decision at all 
costs. For example, in east Texas, resistance was far stronger than in the western part of the 
state. Likewise, in each of the "defiant" states, a handful of white leaders opposed massive 
resistance. 
For purposes of this Article, the distinction between the moderate and defiant states is mea-
sured in terms of (1) at what point in time the state engaged in token integration without court 
order; (2) whether the state adopted an interposition resolution challenging the authority of the 
Supreme Court; and (3) the nature of the legislative agenda adopted in the state following the 
Brown decision. 
In addition to the 11 states of the old Confederacy, there were 6 other "border" states along 
with the District of Columbia that required segregated schools and 4 other states that permitted 
localities to segregate their schools at the time of the Brown decision. These border states deseg-
94 
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Why did white leaders in the moderate states of the upper South 
respond to Brown with less outright defiance than their deep-South 
brethren? The most obvious response is to suggest that the intensity 
of opposition to racial integration varied among the southern states.1o 
Yet those variations, although present to some extent, do not fully 
account for the "moderation" of the upper South. Political leaders in 
the more moderate states steadfastly opposed pupil mixing; what dis-
tinguished them from their more defiant colleagues was their appreci-
ation of the costs of defiance and their willingness to balance other 
concerns against their desire to prevent all pupil mixing. 
First, politicians in the more moderate states understood that to-
ken integration, couched in the language of acceptance of the high 
Court's mandate, could actually fend off more extensive judicially-im-
posed pupil mixing. This understanding was well-founded. On the 
tenth anniversary of Brown, two of the most defiant states-Louisiana 
and Virginia-had a higher percentage of black students attending in-
tegrated schools than did some of the moderate states11 due to ad-
verse court decisions compelling desegregation.12 By the same token, 
those moderate states such as North Carolina that adopted pupil as-
signment plans in response to the Brown decision seemed to accept 
the inevitability of pupil mixing and subsequently engaged in volun-
tary token integration. These states thereby successfully avoided judi-
cially compelled integration throughout the 1950s and retained almost 
totally segregated school systems until the mid-1960s.13 
regated their schools more quickly than did the states of the old Confederacy, although at least 
in some instances, with an eye toward minimizing integration. MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, 
supra note 4, at 22-24; SoUTHERN EDuc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 26-28; Mary L. 
Dudziak, The Limits of Good Faith: Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas, 1950-1956, 5 LAw & HIST. 
REv. 351 (1987). 
10 Most of the scholarship of the post-Brown era in the South has not emphasized the distinc-
tion between defiant states and moderate states, focusing instead on the various forms of mas-
sive resistance throughout the region. Most of these scholars note, however, that the intensity of 
opposition to Brown did vary throughout the region, with the states of the deeper South (along 
with Virginia) generally more defiant than the states of the upper South. See, e.g., BARTLEY, 
supra note 4, at 16 n. 50; MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 16-37; WILHOIT, supra 
note 4, at 27-40; WILKINSON, supra note 4. 
11 On the tenth anniversary of the Brown decision, a higher percentage of black students 
attended integrated schools in the defiant states of Louisiana (.6%) and Virginia (1.6%) than in 
the moderate state of North Carolina (.5% ). SoUTHERN EDuc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, 
at 29. 
12 Adkins v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. 
La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957). 
13 In North Carolina, for example, no litigation seeking the admission of black students into 
white schools would be successful until the 1960s, notwithstanding the fact that the NAACP filed 
more school desegregation lawsuits in North Carolina than in any other southern state during 
the 1950s and the fact that in at least some of the school districts black students were required to 
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Second, political leaders in the moderate states better understood 
the economic costs of massive resistance than did their colleagues in 
the defiant states. During the first decade following the Brown deci-
sion, many southern business leaders, keenly interested in attracting 
new business to the region, feared that racial strife would have an ad-
verse impact on economic development efforts.14 In the moderate 
states, these business leaders effectively influenced governmental pol-
icy on school desegregation in the direction of voluntary token inte-
gration and away from statements defying the Supreme Court. 
Hence, tokenism, clothed in the rhetoric of moderation, became an 
effective tool in the moderate southern states to attract new business 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s.15 
Expressions of "moderation" in the post-Brown South thus did 
not reflect an acceptance of racial desegregation. Rather, "modera-
tion," at the level of both rhetoric and action, became the means by 
which certain white southern leaders sought to avoid extensive pupil 
mixing imposed by the courts and to facilitate economic growth.16 
attend school in another county because of the absence of any schools for black students within 
their home county. See infra text accompanying notes 166-71. 
14 A number of scholars have recently examined the degree of support among southern 
white business leaders for desegregation efforts as a means of facilitating economic growth in 
their region. Although these business leaders did not initiate desegregation efforts, in many 
southern communities they did help facilitate desegregation and quicken its pace. The pressure 
of the courts, the federal government, and black protest groups created an environment whereby 
business leaders helped their communities embrace limited desegregation in the service of 
broader community interests. See, e.g., DAVID R. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY 
CRISIS: ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, 1877-1980 (1985); ELIZABETH ]ACOWAY & DAVID R. COL-
BURN, SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION (1982) (containing essays on the roles of 
business leaders in desegregation efforts in fourteen southern cities); RoBERT NoRRELL, REAP-
ING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MoVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE (1985). 
15 Throughout this century, southern business leaders have sought to attract new capital to 
the region as a means of fostering economic growth. See generally JAMES C. CoBB, THE SELLING 
OF THE SoUTH: THE SOUTHERN CRUSADE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 1936-1980 (1982) 
(describing efforts in the South to encourage industrial expansion in the region by attracting 
outside capital). Southern states such as Virginia that engaged in resistance to the Brown deci-
sion experienced a decline in economic growth during the late 1950s whereas states such as 
North Carolina that appeared to accept the realities of the Brown decision enjoyed substantial 
economic growth during the same period. See infra text accompanying notes 135-40. 
16 To be sure, the racial climate in the moderate southern states had traditionally been Jess 
harsh than in the more defiant states. For example, in the moderate states, the disparities be-
tween the public financing of black and white schools had traditionally been smaller than in the 
defiant states. See, e.g., HARRY S. AsHMORE, THE NEGRO AND THE ScHOOLS 159 (1954). Like-
wise, a higher percentage of black adults were registered to vote in the more moderate states. 
See, e.g., STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SoUTH, 1944-1969 
(1976); PAUL LUEBKE, TAR HEEL POLITICS: MYTHS AND REALITIES 114 (1990) (stating that 
North Carolina had by far the highest percentage of black registered voters of any southern state 
in 1960). Finally, with the exception of Texas, incidents of racial violence, particularly lynchings, 
had typically been Jess frequent in some of the more moderate states. See, e.g., LUEBKE, supra, 
at 102; George C. Rabie, The South and the Politics of Antilynching Legislation, 1920-1940, 51 
J.S. HIST. 201 (1985). 
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These leaders understood that appeals to "moderation," coupled with 
token integration, could thwart most pupil mixing while preserving 
important economic goalsP To be sure, these moderates strenuously 
avoided overt defiance of judicial authority; within the constraints of 
that authority, however, they carefully sought to keep school desegre-
gation to a minimum. 
This Article examines the way in which "moderation" functioned 
during the first decade after Brown by focusing primarily on one of 
the moderate southern states: North Carolina. The selection of North 
Carolina as a state of primary emphasis is deliberate. On the eve of 
the Brown decision, North Carolina enjoyed a public perception as 
being the most racially moderate of all southern states.18 Likewise, in 
the aftermath of Brown, North Carolina was perceived as assuming a 
more moderate response to Brown-at the level of both political rhet-
oric and action-than any other southern state.19 Coupled with this 
image as the most racially progressive of southern states, however, 
was the reality that North Carolina engaged in virtually no pupil mix-
ing during the first decade after Brown, even less than the defiant 
states of Virginia and Louisiana.2° Contrary to the experience in some 
of the defiant states, North Carolina's pupil assignment statute repeat-
edly passed judicial muster,21 thereby keeping the state's schools al-
17 See Dudziak, supra note 9 (providing a parallel discussion of the efforts of school board 
members in a border state-Kansas-to limit pupil mixing). 
18 See, e.g., CHARLES S. JoHNSON, INTo THE MAIN STREAM: A SuRVEY oF BEST PRAcncEs 
IN RAcE RELATIONS IN THE SoUTH 31 (1947); V.O. KEY, JR., SoUTHERN PoLmcs IN STATE AND 
NATION 206 (1949). 
19 Several factors contributed to that perception. First, the North Carolina General Assem-
bly's legislative response to Brown was less extreme than every other southern legislature and it 
was one of only a few southern legislatures not to adopt an "interposition" resolution defying the 
Brown decision. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. In addition, North Carolina was the 
only southern state not to adopt any legislation restricting the activities of the NAACP during 
the 1950s. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. Moreover, at no point did a North 
Carolina governor urge defiance of the Supreme Court, unlike the governors of many other 
southern states. North Carolina's governors argued instead for minimizing the impact of the 
Brown decision through lawful means, couched in the language of "moderation." 
Furthermore, three North Carolina cities-Charlotte, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem-
were among the first in the South to desegregate their schools without court order in September 
1957. The relatively peaceful desegregation in these school systems stood in sharp contrast with 
the simultaneous and far more tumultuous desegregation in Little Rock and helped North Caro-
lina capture nationwide and even worldwide attention as a southern state that had taken a differ-
ent course in race relations. See infra notes 172-83 and accompanying text. Finally, in 1961, one 
North Carolina school system became the first in the South to convert to a pupil assignment plan 
based completely on geography rather than on race. See infra note 191. 
20 By the tenth anniversary of Brown, only .5% of the state's black population attended 
school with white children. SoUTHERN Eouc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 29. In over 
75% of the state's school districts, no black child attended a desegregated school. 11 of the 16 
southern and border states had a higher percentage of black students in white schools than did 
North Carolina in 1964. Id. 
21 See infra note 188. 
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most completely segregated for ten years and vindicating the hopes of 
those "moderates" who argued that token integration would fend off 
more intrusive judicial measures. At the same time, utilizing its repu-
tation for moderation in racial matters, North Carolina enjoyed vi-
brant economic growth during the late 1950s and early 1960s, in 
contrast to some other southern states that engaged in well-publicized 
acts of defiance. 
This Article concludes that the concept of "moderation" in the 
post-Brown South, particularly in North Carolina, was a malleable 
concept, skillfully used to deflect widespread pupil integration. 
Resistance to Brown was far more spectacular in the defiant southern 
states such as Virginia and Louisiana, but equally effective in states 
such as North Carolina that understood the value of tokenism and 
appeals to moderation.22 
II. THE SouTH's REsPONSE TO BnowN 
The initial reaction to the Brown decision varied throughout the 
South. Some southern leaders immediately spoke the language of de-
fiance. Senator James Eastland of Mississippi announced that "the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the false name of law and jus-
tice has perpetrated a monstrous crime. "23 Mississippi Governor 
Hugh L. White stated that "we're not going to pay any attention to the 
Supreme Court's decision. We don't think it will have any effect on us 
down here at all. "24 In fact, no black child would attend school with a 
white child in Mississippi for over a decade. Other states, such as 
Georgia and South Carolina, had already taken action in anticipation 
of the Supreme Court's decision by abolishing the constitutional re-
quirement of public education.25 
Yet in much of the South, even in states that would eventually 
engage in massive resistance, the voice of defiance, at least initially, 
22 The use of tokenism to deflect challenges of exclusion extends well beyond the school 
desegregation context of the 1950s. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED: THE 
ELUSIVE QuEST FOR RAciAL JuSTicE 140-61 (1987). 
23 DAVID R. GoLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SoUTHERN: RAcE RELATIONS AND SoUTH-
ERN CULTURE 1940 TO THE PRESENT 75 (1990). 
24 SARRATT, supra note 4, at 1. 
25 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 21; BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 54. South 
Carolina Governor James Byrnes announced the following before the Court released its deci-
sion: "If the Court changes what is now the law of the land, we will, if it is possible, live within 
the law, preserve the public-school system, and at the same time maintain segregation. If that is 
not possible, reluctantly we will abandon the public-school system." MusE, TEN YEARS OF PREL-
UDE, supra note 4, at 22. After the Court rendered its decision, Georgia Governor Herman 
Talmadge announced: "[t]here will never be mixed schools while I am governor .... The United 
States Supreme Court by its decision today has reduced our Constitution to a mere scrap of 
paper." Constitution Ruined, Says Georgia Governor, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, Mar. 18, 
1954, at 1. 
98 
HeinOnline -- 89 Nw. U. L. Rev.  99 1994-1995
89:92 (1994) Desegregating the South 
was not heard. Louisiana Senator Russell Long announced that 
"although I completely disagree with the decision, my oath of office 
requires me to accept it as the law."26 In Virginia, the state that would 
ultimately devise and lead the South's strategy of massive resistance, 
Attorney General Lindsay Almond, Jr. claimed that "Virginia will ap-
proach the question realistically and endeavor to work out some ra-
tional adjustment." Virginia Governor Thomas Stanley promised to 
"work toward a plan which will be acceptable to our citizens and in 
keeping with the edict of the court."27 In Arkansas, which would be 
home to one of the most celebrated instances of defiance in 1957 with 
the integration of Little Rock's Central High School, Governor Fran-
cis Cherry announced that "Arkansas will obey the law. It always 
has."28 Likewise, in Alabama, first Governor Gordon Persons and 
then Governor Jim Folsom responded to Brown without defiance, re-
fusing initially to enact any special legislation in response to the deci-
sion and then adopting a pupil placement statute modeled after North 
Carolina's, which on its face appeared racially neutral.29 
In time, however, much of the South hardened in its resolve to 
oppose the Brown decision. Such resistance was fueled by the under-
standing that a firm stance on segregation was politically popular 
among white voters. Within three months, the Louisiana legislature 
censured the Supreme Court for its "usurping of power."30 Virginia's 
Governor Stanley announced in June 1954 his desire to "use every 
legal means at my command to continue segregated schools. "31 By 
November 1954, several southern states had enacted legislation to 
forestall implementation of Brown. For example, Louisiana enacted a 
statute requiring the continuation of segregated schools;32 Georgia 
made it a felony for any public official to spend money on an inte-
grated school;33 and Mississippi allowed local school districts to close 
public schools in the face of desegregation initiatives34 and ultimately 
made it unlawful for a white person to attend an integrated school.35 
26 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 20. 
27 Id. at 21. Stanley also commented that his state would find a way to satisfy the Court. 
CHARLES P. RoLAND, THE IMPROBABLE ERA: THE SoUTH SINCE WoRLD WAR II 35 (1975). 
28 WILHOIT, supra note 4, at 31. 
29 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 61-62; WILHOIT, supra note 4, at 32-34. 
Many regarded Alabama, at least initially, as a moderate southern state. But in time, Alabama 
would adopt a posture of resistance. Indeed, no black child would attend school with a white 
child in Alabama until1962. SOUTHERN EDuc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 27. 
30 Louisiana, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 13. 
31 Virginia, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 13. 
32 BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 74; Public Schools-Louisiana, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 239 
(1956) (discussing Act 555 of 1954). 
33 BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 75. 
34 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 24. 
35 BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 76-77. 
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Following the Supreme Court's second Brown decision in May 
1955,36 segregationist feeling in much of the South noticeably in-
creased. During the first three months of 1956, the legislatures of Ala-
bama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia enacted a 
total of forty-two prosegregation statutes.37 Likewise, Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia all 
adopted resolutions of interposition declaring the Brown decision null 
and void and interposing the authority of the state between the high 
Court and the people of the state. Eventually, eight southern states 
drafted some type of interposition measure.38 
Even those "moderate" southern political leaders who initially 
refused to speak in defiance of the Court did not embrace pupil mix-
ing. Florida's Governor LeRoy Collins, who won the title of "the 
moderate Southern Governor" during the mid-1950s, claimed that 
"we can preserve segregation" and sponsored a number of bills in the 
Florida General Assembly that, while moderate in comparison to 
those in other state legislatures, sought to do just that.39 Indeed, no 
black child in Florida would attend an integrated school until1959.40 
III. NORTH CAROLINA'S "MODERATE" RESPONSE TO BROWN 
As most of the South began to articulate its policy of massive 
resistance, the more moderate states of the upper South, particularly 
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas, avoided outright statements of 
defiance. North Carolina in particular measured its response to the 
unwelcome Brown decision against larger state goals: the desire to 
preserve a vibrant economic base and the desire to avoid judicial in-
tervention in the operation of the schools. In so doing, the state con-
tinued certain traditions established during the pre-Brown era. 
A. North Carolina During the Pre-Brown Era 
Throughout the pre-Brown era, North Carolina was regarded as 
the region's most racially moderate state, particularly in matters of 
education.41 The state's political leaders, although strong proponents 
of racial segregation, had supported black education during the half 
century prior to Brown at levels exceeding that of most other southern 
36 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
37 MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 66. See supra note 6 for examples of a 
few of these statutes. 
38 See supra note 5; BARTLEY, supra note 4, at 131; MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra 
note 4, at 71-72. 
39 MusE, TEN YEARS oF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 60. 
40 SOUTHERN EDUC. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 27. 
41 KEY, supra note 18, at 206; JoHNSON, supra note 18, at 31. 
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states.42 Moreover, the North Carolina General Assembly took addi-
tional action during the late 1930s and 1940s that significantly im-
proved the status of black education. However, in so acting, the 
General Assembly was clearly motivated by the desire to .undermine 
NAACP-sponsored litigation that threatened federal court interven-
tion in the operation of North Caroliha's education system. 
In 1939, the North Carolina General Assembly established some 
of the South's first state-supported graduate and professional pro-
grams for black students in response to the United States Supreme 
Court's 1938 decision in Missouri ex ref. Gaines v. Canada.43 In 
Gaines, the Court ordered the state of Missouri either to admit a black 
student to the state's white law school or make some other provision 
for his education. Since no southern state, including North Carolina, 
provided any such educational opportunities for black students, all 
were vulnerable to similar legal challenges and the General Assembly 
acted to avert litigation forcing the integration of its graduate 
schools.44 
Successful litigation in other jurisdictions also prompted the 
North Carolina General Assembly to take action with regard to une-
qual teacher salaries. In 1940, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held in a Virginia case that teacher salary dispari-
ties violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
42 A 1927 NAACP study of southern school financing concluded that disparities in terms of 
expenditures, average class size, and average teacher salaries between black and white schools 
were smaller in North Carolina than in any other southern state. The Negro Common School in 
North Carolina, 34 THE CRISIS 79 (May 1927); The Negro Common School in North Carolina, 34 
THE CRISIS 117 (June 1927); MARK V. TuSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 5-6 (1987). In 1929, Oswald Garrison Villard made a 
similar claim in a Harper's article. Oswald Villard, The Crumbling Color Line, HARPER's MAG., 
July 1929, at 156. This relatively strong support for black education would continue throughout 
the pre-Brown period. In 1935-36, for example, according to the United States Office of Educa-
tion, average expenditures for white children in North Carolina were more than twice that of 
black children, but that gap was the smallest of any of the seven states examined in the South. 
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, BACKGROUND TO PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 14 (1943). Also in 
1937-38, white teacher salaries in North Carolina were about 45% higher than black teacher 
salaries, according to the United States Office of Education-again the smallest gap of any of 
the nine southern states examined. Id. at 16. 
43 305 u.s. 337 (1938). 
44 Epps v. Carmichael, 93 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.N.C. 1950) (discussing actions of North Caro-
lina General Assembly); Augustus Burns, North Carolina and the Negro Dilemma, 1930-1950, at 
131 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). The 
quick action of the General Assembly in response to the Gaines decision reflected a calculated 
desire to prevent judicially-compelled integration of North Carolina's white colleges and univer-
sities. Indeed, shortly after the Gaines decision, Pauli Murray, a black woman and later distin-
guished lawyer and poet, sought admission to the University of North Carolina Law School. 
MoRTON SosNA, IN SEARCH OF THE SILENT SoUTH: SoUTHERN LIBERALS AND THE RACE IssuE 
85-86 (1977). Even though Murray decided not to challenge her exclusion in the courts, the lack 
of a law school for black students had left the state vulnerable in light of the Gaines decision. 
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ment.45 The decision enjoyed wide publicity and the NAACP 
subsequently won similar victories in other states throughout the 
South.46 Cognizant of the potential for similar litigation in North Car-
olina, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction persuaded the 
General Assembly to increase the pay of black teachers.47 As a result, 
throughout the 1940s, the North Carolina General Assembly appro-
priated increasingly larger sums of money to provide for the ultimate 
equalization of black and white teacher salaries.48 By 1945, black 
teachers in North Carolina were actually earning more than white 
teachers because of their higher qualifications, despite the fact no liti-
gation challenging unequal teacher salaries had ever been filed in the 
state.49 
Finally, litigation filed by the NAACP in the late 1940s challeng-
ing the unequal expenditures for black and white schools in North 
Carolina50 and threats by the organization to seek the admission of 
45 Alston v. School Bd., 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940). See generally Bruce Beezer, Black 
Teachers' Salaries and the Federal CourtS Before Brown v. Board of Education: One Beginning 
for Equity, 55 J. NEGRO Eouc. 200 (1986); TusHNET, supra note 42, at 58-65, 78-80, 90-92, 95-
103. 
46 Black teachers eventually won equalization suits in six southern states-Virginia, Florida, 
Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas. JoHNSON, supra note 18, at 137; JoHN H. FRANK-
LIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES 536-37 (1947). 
47 Nathan C. Newbold, Some Achievements in the Equalization of Educational Opportunities 
in North Carolina, 9 Eouc. F. 451 (1945). 
48 Id. 
49 NoRTH CAROLINA ADVISORY CoMM. TO THE U.S. CoMM'N oN CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN NORTH CAROLINA 102 (1962). Just six years earlier, in 1939, white 
teachers in North Carolina had earned 38% more than black teachers. AsHMORE, supra note 16, 
at 159; PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH TODAY AND TOMORROW: A STATISTICAL SURVEY 59 
(Ernst W. Swanson & John A. Griffin eds., 1955). 
Prior to the successful salary equalization litigation in other states, there had been a serious 
but unsuccessful effort in North Carolina to equalize teacher salaries. In 1934 and 1935, a bira-
cial Commission for the Study of Problems in Negro Education appointed by Governor John 
C.B. Ehringhaus had revealed significant disparities between black and white teacher salaries 
and recommended that those disparities be completely eliminated within three to five years. 
Report of Governor's Commission for the Study of Problems in the Education of Negroes in 
North Carolina 96 (1935) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Collection, 
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)); Governor's Commission for the Study of Problems 
in the Education of Negroes in North Carolina: Summarized Reports of Subcommittees and 
Recommendations (1934) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Collection, 
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). The North Carolina General Assembly, however, 
ignored the Commission's recommendations. Absent any judicial precedent compelling such 
salary equalization, the Commission's recommendations carried little weight. 
50 In the late 1940s, the national NAACP's litigation strategy expanded to include challenges 
to unequal elementary and secondary school facilities. In several North Carolina cities, local 
NAACP branches threatened litigation if conditions in black schools did not improve. RALEIGH 
NEws & OBSERVER, June 12, 1946; Burns, supra note 44, at 88-89. Although most local 
branches of the organization ultimately declined to initiate litigation, a few lawsuits were filed. 
In 1951, a federal court found that black schools in Durham were indeed unconstitutionally 
underfunded. Blue v. Durham Pub. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 441 (M.D.N.C. 1951). Other suits 
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black students into white schools if these inequalities persisted51 in-
duced the North Carolina General Assembly to appropriate increas-
ingly larger sums of money for black schools. This increase in 
appropriations had tangible results. Whereas in 1940 the state spent 
seventy-one percent more per white pupil than per black pupil, by 
1952 the difference was seventeen percent-the lowest in the South.52 
But North Carolina's support for black education during the pre-
Brown era did not translate into support for integrated schools. Put-
ting small children of different races together in a classroom ran afoul 
of southern social mores in a way that equalizing school expenditures 
or teacher salaries did not. To challenge public school segregation was 
to challenge a foundation stone of southern culture that divided even 
those of liberal sensibilities. In 1949, for example, the progressive 
North Carolina Commission on Interracial Cooperation dissolved af-
ter nearly three decades due to internal disagreements over the wis-
dom of racial integration.53 Similarly, in June 1950, Willis Smith 
defeated Frank Porter Graham in a bitterly contested Democratic 
runoff primary for the United States Senate in which Smith's allies 
charged that if Graham was elected, pupil mixing would follow. 
were filed chaiienging unequal support for black schools in Wilson, High Point, Washington 
County, Old Fort, Lumberton, and Gaston County. Winborne v. Taylor, 195 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 
1952); Joyner v. McDoweii County Bd. of Educ., 92 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. 1956); GREENSBORO 
DAILY NEws, Apr. 12, 1950; RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 16, 1950; Bums, supra note 44, 
at 100-01; Letter from Donald Ramseur to Keily Alexander (Feb. 3, 1955) (on file with the Keily 
Miiier Alexander, Sr. Papers, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
51 North Carolina State NAACP President Keily Alexander, for example, in his 1949 address 
to the state NAACP convention, cailed for "a county by county campaign" to fight segregated 
education in North Carolina: "This fight should include court action on the elementary, secon-
dary and university level. The goal is an integrated school system." Keiiy Alexander, Address to 
Annual North Carolina Conference of NAACP Branches 6 (June 23, 1949) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Keiiy Miiler Alexander, Sr. Papers, Atkins Library, University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte). For the next several years, Alexander would repeat that call in his an-
nual presidential address. See Keiiy Alexander, Address to Annual North Carolina Conference 
of NAACP Branches 6 (June 1, 1950} (same); Keily Alexander, Address to Annual North Caro-
lina Conference of NAACP Branches 5 (Oct. 17, 1952) (same). 
52 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A., PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
SoUTHERN STATES, 1962, at 64 n.2 (1962); North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10. 
Between 1940 and 1952, per pupil expenditures on black students in North Carolina increased 
462% while per pupil expenditures on white students increased 285%. UNITED STATES CoMM'N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra. 
53 Throughout its tenure, this biracial organization of distinguished North Carolina educators 
and church leaders confronted an array of racial issues; integration proved to be its death kneii. 
See generally Elizabeth Earnhardt, Critical Years: The North Carolina Commission on Interra-
cial Cooperation, 1942-1949 (1971) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina 
(Chapel Hiii}) (describing the final years of the Commission and the effects of integrationist 
efforts). 
Even Frank Porter Graham, perhaps the South's leading racial liberal, held the line against 
racial integration during his tenure as president of the University of North Carolina during the 
1930s and 1940s. SosNA, supra note 44, at 85-86. 
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Smith's racial charges undoubtedly influenced the election.54 Thus, 
although North Carolina adjusted more easily to changing racial de-
mands than did other southern states during the pre-Brown era, the 
state shared the region's deep aversion to the racial mixing that 
Brown seemed to demand. 
B. North Carolina's Initial Response to Brown 
Political leaders in North Carolina initially responded to the 
Brown decision in subdued tones. Most of the state's politicians, re-
flecting the sentiment of the state's white population, opposed school 
integration. But most were also unprepared to engage in hopeless de-
fiance of the high Court that could hurt the state's broader interests. 
Hence, for the next several years, the state's political leaders sought to 
avoid as much integration as possible while taking no action that 
would undermine the state's education system or reputation for mod-
eration on matters of race. Effectively utilizing limited token integra-
tion, North Carolina's leaders would pursue a course of well-
publicized "moderation" in contrast to its more obstreperous southern 
neighbors. 
Upon learning of the Brown decision, North Carolina Governor 
William Umstead, although noting that he was "terribly disappointed" 
by the decision,55 refused to counsel defiance of the high Court, stat-
ing instead that the "Supreme Court of the United States has spo-
ken"56 and that "[t]his is no time for rash statements or the proposal 
of impossible schemes."57 Two days later, Irving Carlyle, a prominent 
North Carolina attorney and Democratic leader, addressed the North 
Carolina Democratic Convention and urged the state to obey the de-
cision: "as good citizens we have no other course except to obey the 
54 JULIAN M. PLEASANTS & AUGUSTUS M. BURNS Ill, FRANK PORTER GRAHAM AND THE 
1950 SENATE RACE IN NORTH CAROLINA 194-99, 215 (1990); MICHAEL MYERSON, NOTHING 
CouLD BE FINER 33 (1978). One pro-Smith handbill asked voters if they wanted "Negroes 
going to white schools and white children going to Negro schools." ld. 
55 Umstead 'Terribly Disappointed' Man, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, May 18, 1954, at 1; 
North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10. 
56 WILLIAM UMSTEAD, PUBLIC ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF WILLIAM BRADLEY UMSTEAD, 
GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1953-1954, at 201 (David Corbitt ed., 1957). 
57 William B. Umstead, A Statement by Governor William B. Umstead 2 (May 27, 1954) 
(unpublished transcript, on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State 
Archives, Raleigh, N.C.). Governor Umstead did announce that in light of the Supreme Court's 
decision to postpone consideration of the remedy issue the state's schools would continue to 
operate on a segregated basis. North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10. 
However, the day after the decision was announced, the Greensboro (N.C.) School Board 
became one of the first in the United States to resolve to study ways of complying with the 
decision; the Board chair announced that "we must not fight or attempt to circumvent this deci-
sion." North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10. 
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law laid down by the United States Supreme Court."58 The conven-
tion adopted a resolution affirming "the supremacy of the law for all 
citizens."59 The resolution was not an endorsement of Brown, but it 
did reflect the fact that much of the political leadership of North Car-
olina did not care to flout the Supreme Court's authority.60 
Within weeks of the Brown decision, Governor Umstead, in his 
first significant response to the decision, directed the North Carolina 
Institute of Government, a branch of the University of North Caro-
lina, to prepare a report analyzing Brown and outlining possible re-
sponses to the decision. The selection of the Institute to prepare the 
state's initial analysis of Brown was significant. The Institute, under 
the leadership of Director Albert Coates, had since the 1930s offered 
the state an impressive array of critical analyses of public policy 
issues.61 
Governor Umstead met with Coates and his assistant, James 
Paul, to discuss their work. He articulated his fear that a demagogue 
might exploit the school desegregation issue for political advantage in 
North Carolina and thus do serious damage to the state and its reputa-
tion. Umstead reminded Coates and Paul that the 1950 Democratic 
primary between Graham and Smith62 had unleashed a great deal of 
58 WILLIAM CHAFE, C!VILmES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA AND 
THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 65-66 (1980). Some have suggested that his candor cost 
Carlyle appointment to the vacant U.S. Senate seat. John Batchelor, Save Our Schools: Dallas 
Herring and the Governor's Special Advisory Committee on Education 24 (1983) (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Greensboro). 
59 CHAFE, supra note 58, at 66. 
60 Just as the state's politicians were addressing the question of school desegregation, so were 
the state's religious institutions. Imbued with considerable moral authority in a deeply religious 
region, the various religious groups within the state divided on the issue. This division reflected 
the conflict between decades of segregationist traditions and a moral disquiet with racial separa-
tion. The Western North Carolina Conference of the Methodist Church met in the fall of 1954 
and considered a very mild resolution that would have expressed "sympathy" for public school 
administrators sorting out desegregation problems and would have recognized "the obligation of 
all citizens to obey the law of the land" and that the issue must be resolved "in the light of the 
teachings of Jesus Christ." North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Nov. 4, 1954, at 13. The resolution 
failed; the Conference instead resolved much more weakly to ask its various constituent institu-
tions to "study" the issue. Id. The Southern Presbyterian Journal, a semi-official organ of the 
southern Presbyterian Church, a leading denomination in the state, deplored the destruction of 
"racial integrity as it has developed in the province of God" and contended that school segrega-
tion "is not unChristian." N.C. Courts Block Efforts to Prevent Desegregation, S. ScH. NEws, 
Sept. 1957, at 15. The General Assembly of the denomination, however, opposed school 
segregation. 
On the other hand, the Episcopal Diocese of North Carolina in June 1954 adopted a resolu-
tion asking Episcopalians to "work toward an orderly transition to an integrated public school 
system." North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10. Th~ Catholic bishop in North Caro-
lina required the immediate desegregation of Catholic high schools in the state following the first 
Brown decision. North Carolina, S. SCH. NEws, Oct. 1, 1954, at 11. 
61 See generally ALBERT COATES, THE STORY OF THE INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT (1960). 
62 See supra text accompanying note 54. 
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racial bitterness, which had caused the state great harm. The Gover-
nor feared that the Brown decision, if mishandled, could cause similar 
problems.63 
Within three months, the Institute submitted a lengthy and de-
tailed analysis of the Court's decision and the various legal responses 
available to the state.64 The report, written in large measure by Paul, 
who had recently finished a clerkship with United States Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Fred Vinson, was one of the most balanced and 
dispassionate analyses of the Brown decision prepared during the 
1950s. This achievement was all the more remarkable in light of the 
rancor of much of the contemporaneous discussion of the decision 
throughout the South. 
The Institute report analyzed several of the proposed responses 
to Brown that were gaining favor in other southern states, such as the 
creation of a state-supported private school system and the utilization 
of private school tuition grants. The report concluded that the consti-
tutionality of such proposals was doubtful65 and that, in order for the 
state to avert judicial challenge to its pupil assignment scheme, some 
black students must receive assignments to white schools. 66 Although 
the report did not make explicit recommendations, it suggested that 
the state refrain from openly defying the Supreme Court because such 
action would result in "litigious harassment, damage suits, and possi-
bly considerable court supervision." The authors instead encouraged 
a program of gradual desegregation that would allow "a minimum of 
court interference and a minimum of sudden change."67 The Institute 
report clearly contemplated some desegregation, in marked contrast 
to the declarations of several other southern states, although it recog-
nized that such desegregation efforts would take time given the polit-
ical realities of the mid-1950s.6s 
63 Telephone Interview with James Paul, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School (Feb. 24, 
1993). 
64 JAMES PAUL & ALBERT COATES, THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION DECISION (1954). 
65 The Institute report relied on an earlier Fourth Circuit decision, Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free 
Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), which dealt with the constitutionality of racially based 
exclusions from publicly supported institutions. The Kerr decision made it likely that public 
support for racially restrictive private schools would be found unconstitutional. 
66 PAUL & CoATES, supra note 64, at 90-92. That conclusion was a reasonable reading of 
Brown, but it overestimated the willingness of the federal courts in the near future to scrutinize 
closely the actions of southern school boards. 
67 Id. at 118. 
68 See supra text accompanying notes 30-38. Paul's brief tour in the South would end when 
he returned to his native Pennsylvania and joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School in 1955. 
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C. The Pearsall Committee 
In August 1954, having received the Institute report, Governor 
Umstead appointed a nineteen-person committee-including three 
black members-under the leadership of former Speaker of the 
House Thomas J. Pearsall to study the desegregation issue. Umstead 
presented the Pearsall Committee with copies of the Institute's report 
and emphasized the report's gradual approach.69 Pearsall announced 
at the outset that his primary goal was to preserve the public schools, 
an obvious reference to the discussion in many southern states about 
abandoning the public school system.7° 
Throughout the fall, as the Committee did its work, Umstead 
continued to resist pressure from segregationists to publicly defy the 
Supreme Court. In September 1954, for example, Umstead refused to 
endorse a petition from a large number of his constituents favoring 
the continuation of school segregation.71 When other southern politi-
cians joined the call for defiance, Umstead resisted such action and 
sought to defuse any racial demagoguery that could harm the state.72 
69 Batchelor, supra note 58, at 32. Umstead also presented the Committee members with a 
copy of Harry Ashmore's The Negro and the Schools, a 1954 Ford Foundation study of desegre-
gation which detailed the broad discrepancies between black and white education in America. 
ASHMORE, supra note 16, at 33-34. Having examined previous desegregation efforts outside of 
the South, the Ashmore study concluded that "it is axiomatic that separate schools can be 
merged only with great difficulty, if at all, when a great majority of the citizens who support 
them are opposed to the move." I d. at 81-82. That aspect of the Ashmore study would be used 
by desegregation opponents to legitimate a lack of integration in the face of community 
opposition. 
70 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 3, 1954, at 10. 
71 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Oct. 1, 1954, at 11. 
72 Although North Carolina's leaders publicly eschewed defiance, they did seek to persuade 
the United States Supreme Court to reject school desegregation in the rehearing on the Brown 
case. In the fall of 1954, the state's Attorney General submitted a brief to the Court on the 
remedy question in the Brown case which argued that desegregation was simply not feasible in 
North Carolina. The brief, drafted in large measure by segregationist Beverly Lake, an Assistant 
Attorney General, concluded that desegregation would cause substantial disruption and even 
violence in North Carolina's schools based on a survey of the opinions of law enforcement of-
ficers and school superintendents. Brief of Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Caro-
lina, Amicus Curiae, in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME CoURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 983-85 (Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 
1975). Any attempt to desegregate the schools, Lake argued, could lead to the abandonment of 
public education. In a statement that betrayed a profound misunderstanding of the direction 
that school desegregation law would take, Lake concluded that in the state's cities with signifi-
cant residential segregation, the Brown decision would have little impact. He worried instead 
about rural North Carolina where blacks and whites lived in desegregated residential patterns 
and where a race-neutral pupil assignment plan would result in extensive desegregation. Brief of 
Harry McMullan, Attorney General of North Carolina, Amicus Curiae, supra, at 985; North 
Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Dec. 1, 1954, at 11. Ironically, Lake had initially opposed appearing in 
the Brown case, fearing that the state's appearance would give the Supreme Court jurisdiction 
over North Carolina schools. Letter from James Paul to author (Sept. 20, 1993) (on file with 
Northwestern University Law Review). 
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The Pearsall Committee completed its report four months later 
on December 30,1954. Governor Umstead had died on November 7, 
so the Committee submitted its report to his successor, Governor Lu-
ther Hodges, a former textile executive who had entered politics in 
1952 with his election as Lieutenant Governor. Hodges perceived 
himself as a businessman first and foremost; indeed, he entitled his 
autobiography, published a few years after his tenure as Governor, 
Businessman in the Statehouse.73 Throughout his six years as Gover-
nor, Hodges was an aggressive proponent of economic development; 
one of his lasting legacies was the creation of Research Triangle Park 
west of Raleigh for the purpose of promoting corporate and govern-
ment research.74 Hodges's concern for the way in which his policy 
decisions affected business animated his administration, including his 
treatment of the desegregation issue. 
At first blush, the Pearsall Committee's report seemed to dash 
any hope that the state might move toward substantial desegregation, 
gradual or otherwise. The Committee, including the three black mem-
bers, unanimously concluded that "the mixing of the races forthwith in 
the public schools throughout the State can not be accomplished and 
should not be attempted" because it "would alienate public support of 
the schools to such an extent that they could not be operated success-
fully."75 Although the use of the word "forthwith" introduced a de-
gree of ambiguity into the Committee's conclusions, leaving open the 
question whether the Committee contemplated the eventual desegre-
gation of the schools, the report expressed strong opposition to school 
desegregation. 
On the other hand, the report avoided recommending any legisla-
tive action such as school closings or the use of private school tuition 
grants, which were gaining popularity in other southern states and 
which might undermine the public schools. Indeed, the only legisla-
tive action that the Committee recommended was the transfer of au-
thority over pupil assignments from the state to local school boards.76 
That the state would take such a strong position in its Brown brief was not surprising. The 
Governor and the Attorney General had studiously avoided counseling defiance of the Supreme 
Court, but they were quite anxious to avoid pupil mixing by any lawful means available. 
73 LUTHER HoDGES, BUSINESSMAN IN THE STATEHOUSE: SIX YEARS AS GOVERNOR OF 
NORTH CAROLINA (1962). 
74 JACK BASS & WALTER DEVRIES, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 229-30 
(1976). 
75 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Feb. 3, 1955, at 14. Although the Committee recommenda-
tion was unanimous, there was some dissent. One white member, Dallas Herring, did not want 
to join the report, but did so under pressure to make the report unanimous. Batchelor, supra 
note 58, at 100-01. 
76 On the widely discussed school closing question, the Committee recommended that the 
public school system be preserved, although it did note that "abandoning or materially altering" 
the public school system might eventually be necessary. North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Feb. 3, 
1955, at 14. 
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The report thus set the state on a course that it would follow for the 
next several years: avoid the strident responses to Brown, which 
might damage the state's moderate reputation, but minimize as much 
as possible the amount of school desegregation.77 
When the North Carolina General Assembly convened its regular 
legislative session in January 1955, one of the legislature's primary 
items of business was consideration of the Pearsall Committee's re-
port. Governor Hodges endorsed the report as an appropriate and 
"moderate" response to the crisis brought about by the Brown deci-
sion. Hodges, echoing the concern of his predecessor Umstead, an-
nounced that the recommendations outlined in the report "protect 
what we think are our rights without any demagoguery."78 On March 
30, 1955, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted legislation 
that vested local school boards with exclusive authority over pupil as-
signments.79 The statute expressly directed local school boards not to 
consider race as an assignment criteria.80 Assistant Attorney General 
Beverly Lake informed the Supreme Court in oral argument in April 
77 The support of the Committee's three black members, although troubling to many in the 
black community, particularly the NAACP, was not surprising. Each of the three was employed 
by the state and hence disinclined to dissent from the majority view. Moreover, two of the three 
black members were heads of all-black. state colleges that had benefitted from the legacy of 
segregated education in the state. 
The NAACP issued a statement claiming that the three "were not free to express their 
personal opinion" and did not reflect "the majority opinion of fellow Negroes of North Caro-
lina." Kelly Alexander, Implementation of .the United States Supreme Court Decision of May 
17, 1954 in North Carolina 11 (1954) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Kelly Miller 
Alexander, Sr. Papers, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). Yet the latter 
claim was open to question. An American Institute of Public Opinion Survey found in February 
1956 that only 53% of southern blacks polled supported the Brown decision-in large measure 
because of fear of mistreatment of black children in white schools. Richard Lamanna, The Ne-
gro Public School Teacher and School Desegregation: A Survey of Negro Teachers in North 
Carolina 54 (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). 
Although the support of southern blacks for school desegregation would dramatically increase 
over the course of the next few years, during the first few years after Brown, the NAACP's 
integrationist agenda was not shared by all members of the black community. 
78 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Feb. 3, 1955, at 14. 
79 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955). The statute gave local school boards "full and com-
plete" authority to enroll school children and provided that the school board's "decision as to 
the enrollment of any pupil in any such school shall be final." Id. In making these decisions, 
school boards were directed to consider "the orderly and efficient administration" of the schools, 
"the effective instruction of the pupils," and the "health, safety, and general welfare of such 
pupils." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-177 (1955). 
Although many southern states chose to wait for the Supreme Court's remedial decision in 
the Brown case before taking legislative action, the North Carolina state legislature, pursuant to 
the recommendations of the Institute of Government, preferred to go ahead and grant local 
school boards discretion in making pupil assignments to avoid the possibility of one lawsuit de-
segregating all of the state's schools. 
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176 (1955). 
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1955 during the second Brown case that the statute would permit a 
local school board to operate mixed-race schools.81 
Although the new legislation appeared racially neutral and hence 
moderate in comparison to the legislative enactments in several other 
southern states, in fact it contained certain features that inhibited 
widespread desegregation. First, the legislation decentralized assign-
ment authority making it impossible to challenge pupil assignments 
without bringing suit against each individual school board. Second, 
the legislation established a complicated system of administrative ap-
peals through which challenges to school board assignments had to be 
made and transfer requests filed. No black student could legally chal-
lenge an assignment to a segregated school unless that student had 
faithfully adhered to all specified administrative procedures. Many 
black children would lose their opportunity to challenge a school as-
signment because they failed to comply with some detail of the admin-
istrative appeal process. Thus, while on its face the legislation 
appeared to constitute an abandonment of previous race-based pupil 
assignments, in practice every school board in the state would con-
tinue to assign students to school on the basis of race until the early 
1960s.82 At the same time, most school boards would deny all re-
quests filed by black students to transfer to a white school.83 
Yet the actions of the North Carolina General Assembly were 
perceived as moderate and enlightened when compared to that of 
most other southern states. Unlike some other southern state legisla-
tures, North Carolina's General Assembly had resisted efforts to enact 
a constitutional amendment abolishing the requirement of public 
schools and providing tuition grants to parents who wished to place 
their children in private schools. In addition, the Assembly had re-
jected legislation providing that any school district which permitted 
desegregation be denied state funds.84 Governor Hodges, concerned 
about the negative impact these proposals would have on the state's 
relatively strong public school system and hence economic climate, la-
beled them "extreme and untimely."85 Hodges ultimately persuaded 
the legislators who sponsored these bills to withdraw them pending 
81 Oral Argument, Brown v. Board of Educ. (Apr. 13, 1955), in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS, supra note 72, at 1227. 
82 See infra note 188. 
83 See infra text accompanying notes 170-71. 
84 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Mar. 3, 1955, at 13; North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Apr. 7, 
1955, at 12. Other states would take a different course. Louisiana and South Carolina, for exam-
ple, enacted legislation in 1954 and 1955, respectively, requiring a fund cutoff for schools that 
desegregated. Education: Public Schools-Louisiana, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 239 (1956); Educa-
tion: Public Schools-South Carolina, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 241 (1956). 
85 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Mar. 3, 1955, at 13. North Carolina had long recognized 
the relationship between a strong public school system, an educated workforce, and economic 
progress. In 1950, for example, North Carolina ranked fifth in the nation in percentage of in-
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the Supreme Court's upcoming remedial decision in the Brown case.86 
Hodges understood that delegation of assignment authority to local 
school boards would achieve the same results as the proposed consti-
tutional amendment, but without the rancor and damage to the public 
schools that would accompany outright defiance. Recognizing the 
broader economic interests at stake, the Governor sought to avoid 
harm to the state that would ensue should the General Assembly 
abolish the constitutional requirement of a public education system. 
D. The Second Pearsall Committee 
Yet one year later, in 1956, the North Carolina General Assembly 
enacted a more ambitious legislative program aimed at reducing the 
threat of school desegregation and which appeared at first blush to 
embrace certain of the more extreme positions taken in other states. 
In the spring of 1955, the North Carolina General Assembly had cre-
ated a second education commission, also known as the Pearsall Com-
mittee, to make further study of the desegregation question. 87 In 
April1956, this second Pearsall Committee, working in close consulta-
tion with Hodges, issued its report, which explicitly expressed a desire 
to maintain segregated schools:88 
The educational system of North Carolina has been built on the 
foundation stone of segregation of the races in the schools. . . . The 
come spent on public education. North Carolina: The Integration Issue, RALEIGH NEWS & OB-
SERVER, Mar. 15, 1956. 
86 North Carolina, S. ScH. NEws, Apr. 7, 1955, at 12. Hodges later commented that: 
"[a]bolition of the public schools ... is a last-ditch and double-edged weapon. If that weapon is 
ever used in North Carolina, its result will be appalling in ignorance, poverty, and bitterness." 
Luther Hodges, Address on State-Wide Radio-Television Network, (Aug. 8, 1955) in 1 
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF LUTHER HODGES, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAR-
OLINA, 1954-1961, at 210 (James W. Patton ed., 1960). 
The pragmatism of the North Carolina General Assembly was perhaps best manifest in one 
final piece of legislation enacted in 1955: a statute providing for the termination of all teacher 
contracts at year end, subject to renewal on a one-year basis. Attorney General Harry McMul-
lan promoted that legislation, arguing that the courts were likely to disallow the current dual 
school system and that some teachers would lose their jobs if black and white schools were 
merged. North Carolina, S. SCH. NEws, June 8, 1955, at 13. By terminating teacher contracts, 
the state could avoid contractual liability for teacher layoffs should a court order a school system 
to consolidate its schools. Moreover, the Supreme Court had still not announced its remedial 
decision in Brown, and many feared that the Court might order immediate desegregation. The 
statute reflected a legislature prepared to adapt itself to the realities of desegregation, not one 
prepared to avoid desegregation at all costs. 
87 Governor Hodges appointed seven white men to the new Committee, later explaining that 
black members would have been under too much pressure from outside groups to push for im-
mediate desegregation. HoDGES, supra note 73, at 83. 
88 In December 1955, the Advisory Committee notified Hodges, in advance of the release of 
its report, that its proposal would maintain support for the public schools but deflect as much 
integration as possible. N.C. is Told 1955 'Assignment' Statute Provides Best Defense, S. ScH. 
NEws, Feb. 1956, at 12. 
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Supreme Court of the United States destroyed the school system which 
we had developed-a segregated-by-law system .... [The Committee is] 
proposing the building of a new school system on a new foundation-a 
foundation of no racial segregation by law, but assignment according to 
natural racial preference and the administrative determination of what is 
best for the child.89 
In a reversal from the prior year, the Committee's "Pearsall Plan" 
provided for constitutional amendments allowing both private school 
tuition grants for parents whose children were assigned to a desegre-
gated school and local referenda whereby a community could decide 
whether to close its schools instead of desegregating them.90 Both the 
Governor and the General Assembly had rejected school closing legis-
lation a year earlier, but now the Pearsall Plan gave local communities 
the option of taking that course of action. 
Governor Hodges publicly embraced the Pearsall Plan with its 
more extreme provisions.91 It was a clear reversal for the Governor. 
One year earlier, Hodges had successfully led an effort to defeat 
school closing legislation.92 Now, Hodges supported a constitutional 
amendment permitting the closure of the public schools. When 
Hodges went before the General Assembly during the summer of 
1956 to defend the Pearsall Plan, he offered a much more aggressive 
defense of racial segregation than he had in 1955: "It is my firm belief 
that ... the people of North Carolina expect their General Assembly 
and their governor to do everything legally possible to prevent their 
children from being forced to attend mixed schools against their 
wishes. "93 
The General Assembly ratified the Pearsall Plan following a spe-
cial four-day session in July 1956 and submitted the proposed constitu-
tional amendments to the electorate for a statewide vote. Two months 
later, in September 1956, the voters of North Carolina approved the 
constitutional amendments allowing tuition grants and local referenda 
on school closings by a four-to-one margin.94 
89 Report of the North Carolina Advisory Committee on Education, Report, 1 RAcE REL. L. 
REP. 581, 582-85 (1956). 
90 Id. at 585. 
91 N.C. Advisory Committee Asks 2 Constitutional Amendments, S. ScH. NEws, May 1956, at 
6. 
92 Moreover, in June 1955, in a statewide broadcast, Hodges had told the state that if school 
boards failed to make a start toward compliance, they might face legal action forcing the admis-
sion of black students to white schools. Luther Hodges, Address over Statewide Radio-Televi-
sion Network (June 6, 1955), in MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 86, at 
152. 
93 Luther Hodges, Message to the Special Session of the General Assembly (July 23, 1956), 
in MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 86, at 33. 
94 N.C. Adopts 'Pearsall Plan' By 4 to 1; Challenge Quickly Filed in U.S. Court, S. ScH. NEws 
Oct. 1956, at 7. Of the state's major newspapers, only the Charlotte Observer, Raleigh Times, 
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Although the Pearsall Plan seemed to mark a significant shift in 
the public policy of North Carolina on the segregation issue, in fact, 
the plan did far less than the legislative schemes that had been 
adopted in other southern states. Four states abolished state constitu-
tional requirements of public education.95 Six states passed legislation 
to withhold aid from schools that desegregated.96 Eight states enacted 
interposition resolutions urging either outright defiance of the 
Supreme Court's Brown decision or at least every possible action to 
avoid its reach.97 Ten states passed legislation that inhibited the activ-
ities of the NAACP.98 North Carolina was the only southern state to 
take none of those actions. Indeed, North Carolina's General Assem-
bly enacted fewer statutes and promulgated fewer resolutions 
throughout the 1950s than did any other southern state legislature in 
response to Brown. 
Moreover, on close inspection, the Pearsall Plan promised more 
than it actually delivered. The plan did not mandate school closings in 
the face of desegregation; it merely permitted a local referendum on 
the question in the school board's discretion. The distinction was an 
important one. On at least one occasion, when a citizens' group 
sought a school closing referendum over token integration, the local 
school board simply denied the request.99 Indeed, no school was ever 
closed in North Carolina under the closing provision. By comparison, 
legislation enacted in other southern states, such as Virginia, required 
and Winston-Salem Journal opposed the plan. N.C. Editors State Pearsall Plan Views, DuRHAM 
MORNING HERALD, Sept. 6, 1956, at 3A. 
95 JoHN B. MARTIN, THE DEEP SoUTH SAYS "NEVER" 11 (1957). The four states were 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina. 
96 The states were Arkansas, 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1042 (1958); Georgia, 1 RACE REL. L. 
REP. 421 (1956); Louisiana, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 239 (1956); Mississippi, 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 
553 (1958); South Carolina, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 241 (1956); and Virginia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 
1091 (1956). 
97 See supra note 6. Governor Hodges was sharply criticized for the state's failure to enact 
an interposition resolution. Letter from Lunsford Crew to Luther Hodges (Jan. 30, 1956) (on file 
with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, N.C.). 
98 Wilma C. Peebles, School Desegregation in Raleigh, North Carolina, 1954-1964, at 56 
(1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)). The 10 
states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, and Virginia. Six of these states passed particularly onerous legislation that 
obliged the NAACP to disclose its membership lists. WASBY ET. AL, supra note 8, at 181-92. See 
generally Walter Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. PoL. Q. 371 
(1959). 
99 Charlotte Parents Initiate Moves Aimed at Utilizing Pearsall Plan's Provisions, S. ScH. 
NEws, Aug. 1958, at 15. The statute provided that the School Board had the authority to call for 
a referendum upon being presented with a petition by 15% of the registered voters residing in 
the area in question. Moreover, the school closing referendum could be restricted to the closure 
of a single school, as opposed to the closure of all of the schools in the school system. Robert 
Wettach, North Carolina School Legislation-1956, 35 N.C. L. REv. 1, 7 (1956). 
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that schools close in the face of desegregation orders.100 Dozens of 
schools were eventually closed throughout the South in order to avoid 
desegregation. 1m 
Likewise, no student ever received a private school tuition grant 
in North Carolina, even though thousands of these grants were pro-
vided in other southern states.102 When a student finally requested a 
private school tuition grant in North Carolina, the grant provision was 
deemed unconstitutional in a court challenge.103 Significantly, the at-
torney arguing that the tuition grant provision was unconstitutional 
had been a member of the Pearsall Committee responsible for its 
adoption. 
Accordingly, the Pearsall Plan did not reflect a major shift in the 
views of the state's political leadership on the issue of school integra-
tion. Rather, it reflected the increasing militancy of southern segrega-
tionists and the need to defuse the pressure to take more extreme 
action. In effect, the tuition grant and school closing components of 
the Pearsall Plan served a symbolic function: they placated segrega-
tionists, but left the state's public schools essentially untouched. 
Hodges referred to the school closing and tuition grant provisions as 
"safety valves."104 Pearsall himself later explained his perceptions of 
the Committee's motivations: "What we were doing was buying time. 
The people had to have a psychological safety valve. They had to 
100 Virginia's pupil placement statute was declared unconstitutional in January 1957 in large 
part because of the mandatory school closing provision. Adkins v. School Bd. of Newport 
News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957). 
101 Lawyer Recalls 'Buying Time' for Integration, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976, 
at 1. Moreover, when a few North Carolina school districts admitted black students to white 
schools for the first time in 1957, Governor Hodges did nothing to stop it, noting that the place-
ment statute gave local school boards the authority to make their own decisions. 
While Hodges sat silent, Governor Faubus of Arkansas, also a southern "moderate" gover-
nor, threw his state into an uproar by seeking to prevent the simultaneous desegregation of the 
Little Rock schools. Whereas Faubus legitimized violent resistance to desegregation in Arkan-
sas by his conduct and statements, Hodges avoided the issue. Arkansas would experience a 
substantial downturn in new business investment in the several years following the Little Rock 
crisis, but North Carolina, under the leadership of its "businessman in the statehouse," exper-
ienced no such downturn. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE HIGH COST OF CONFLicr: A 
RouNDUP oF OPINION FROM THE SoUTHERN BusiNESS CoMMUNITY ON THE EcoNOMIC CoNSE· 
QUENCES OF SCHOOL CI:OSINGS AND VIOLENCE 1 (1963). 
102 Editorial-First Job of Both Races: to Retain Public Schools, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
Nov. 14, 1963, at 2B. 
103 No Surprise Involved in End to Plan, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Apr. 5, 1966, at 1. 
104 Luther Hodges, Address Before Combined Parent-Teacher Associations of Cabarrus 
County (Apr. 20, 1956), in MESSAGES, ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 86, at 331. 
State Treasurer Edwin Gill emphasized this point in a radio address in September 1956: 
It is the hope of the supporters of the Pearsall Plan that under its terms no single school 
will be closed, and that it will be unnecessary to provide a single educational expense grant. 
In other words, the Pearsall Plan is offered as a last resort if other programs fail. That is 
why the provisions for educational expense grants and local option are called safety valves 
to be used only when all other means have failed to give relief to deeply-felt emotions and 
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know that if things really got terrible, they could close the schools .... 
The plan gave desperate people something to hang onto while we pro-
ceeded, little by little, with integration."105 Although Pearsall's com-
ments were clearly self-serving, he was probably on target. 
Desegregation would inevitably come to North Carolina, but the 
Pearsall Plan gave the state's political leaders an opportunity to ap-
pease segregationist sentiment without unduly disrupting the state's 
public schools. 
To be sure, the southern mood on desegregation had noticeably 
stiffened by 1956.106 Although there had been some resistance to 
Brown during the first year following the decision, many southern pol-
iticians, understanding that political capital could be gained from 
resistance, began to take more aggressive postures of defiance in early 
1956. Beginning in February of that year, one southern state legisla-
ture after another passed nullification or interposition resolutions de-
fying or at least challenging the Supreme Court's authority and they 
passed more extensive legislation undermining efforts to desegregate 
the schools.107 During the first three months of 1956, the legislatures 
of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia-five 
of the most defiant states-enacted a total of forty-two pro-segrega-
tion statutes.10S 
Moreover, in March 1956, 92 of the 106 southern members of 
Congress signed a "Southern Manifesto" which claimed that Brown 
was illegitimate and that they would do everything they could to re-
other pent-up feelings that might otherwise explode and be destructive of the public 
schools. 
Edwin Gill, Radio Address 4 (Sept. 6, 1956) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Luther Hart-
well Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, N.C.) (emphasis in original). 
105 Lawyer Recalls 'Buying 1ime' for Integration, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976, 
at 1. 
106 Public opinio_n polls are but one indicator of the changing mood. In 1954, 24% of 
southerners approved of the Brown decision; by May 1955 (before the second Brown decision) 
that figure had dropped to 20%. MELVIN TUMIN, SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION: A DI-
GEST OF REcENT RESEARCH 105-07 (1957). In 1954, 15% of white southerners indicated that 
they would not object to sending their children to an integrated school; by 1959, that figure was 
8%. Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Race Relations, 26 Pus. OPINION Q. 137, 140-41 (1962). 
107 See supra notes 5 and 6. Arkansas, a relatively moderate state by southern standards, 
provides a good example of shifting moods on the race issue. In 1956, Governor Orval Faubus 
won re-election as the moderate candidate, defeating a challenge from a segregationist oppo-
nent. Yet less than a year later, Faubus shifted his position, personally directing an extraordinary 
effort to thwart the desegregation of the Little Rock schools in defiance of a judicial order. 
Faubus's blandishments on the segregation issue would win him several more terms in the gover-
nor's mansion. J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN: SoUTHERN FEDERAL JuDGES AND 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 32 (1961). 
108 MusE, TEN YEARS oF PRELUDE, supra note 4, at 66. 
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verse it.l09 All but three members of the North Carolina delegation 
signed the Manifesto.110 The Manifesto legitimated defiance. As one 
contemporary noted, "[T]he true meaning of the Manifesto was to 
make defiance of the Supreme Court and the Constitution socially ac-
ceptable in the South-to give resistance to the law the approval of 
the Southern Establishment."111 
At the same time, the White House remained aloof from school 
desegregation efforts, giving further encouragement to those urging 
resistance. President Eisenhower steadfastly and repeatedly refused 
to endorse the Brown decision. Eisenhower also declined to authorize 
procedures for investigating complaints arising out of desegregation 
efforts, and he refused to seek enforcement legislation from Congress. 
Public opinion polls taken in the summer of 1955 indicated that the 
public perceived the President as encouraging the maintenance of ra-
cial segregation.112 In February 1956, when questioned about the vari-
ous interposition resolutions enacted in southern states challenging 
the Supreme Court's authority, Eisenhower responded weakly that 
the issue was "filled with argument on both sides"; one month later, 
he declined comment on the Southern Manifesto.113 
As a result of the more aggressive activities of segregationists, 
pressure increased on southern politicians to take additional action 
against the threat of pupil mixing. In large measure, the Pearsall 
Committee's 1956 proposals were intended to mute the demands of 
North Carolina segregationists, such as Assistant Attorney General 
Beverly Lake, who were ready to abandon the public school system 
over the issue of segregation and who were building a political base 
around that issue. In July 1955, Lake made a widely publicized speech 
in which he called for an amendment to the state constitution that 
109 The Manifesto read in part as follows: 
We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a clear abuse of 
judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal judiciary undertaking to legislate, in dero-
gation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States 
and the people. 
We commend the motives of those states which have declared the intention to resist 
forced integration by any lawful means. 
We pledge ourselves to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision 
which is contrary to the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation. 
102 CoNG. REc. 4515-16 (1956). 
110 One North Carolina member, Congressman Cooley, called the Manifesto "a dangerous 
document, calculated to aggravate the situation"; Cooley also concluded that it held out false 
hope of legal resistance to Brown. Cooley Terms Racial Document 'Dangerous,' DuRHAM 
MoRNING HERALD, Mar. 14, 1956, at 1A. 
111 GoLDFIELD, supra note 23, at 65 (quoting Anthony Lewis). 
112 RoBERT F. BuRK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 144-45, 
152-53 (1984). 
113 !d. at 160-62. 
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would abolish the requirement of public schools.l14 In August 1955, 
within weeks of Lake's speech, Hodges hinted in a statewide address 
that school closing might ultimately be required if his program of vol-
untary segregation failed: "[I]f we are not able to succeed in a pro-
gram of voluntary separate school attendance, the State within the 
next year or so will be face to face with deciding the issue of whether 
it shall have some form of integrated public schools or shall abandon 
its public schools."ll5 
Governor Hodges changed his posture on the school closing and 
tuition grant issues to deflect the attacks of segregationists such as 
Lake. He justified his shift to a conference of editorial writers in May 
1956: "If I hadn't come out for [the Pearsall Plan], a racist would have 
run against me [for Governor] and torn our state apart with ha-
tred."116 Hodges thwarted that threat by simply embracing certain as-
pects of the segregationist agenda while positioning both himself and 
the Pearsall Plan as the "moderate" alternative. As Lake became 
more vocal during the summer of 1955 on the segregation question by 
attacking the NAACP, Hodges increased his own attacks on the 
NAACP as an "extremist" organization composed of outsiders who 
did not represent the views of most black North Carolinians. More-
over, Hodges supported Lake in the face of calls by the NAACP for 
Lake's removal.117 In so doing, Hodges recognized that Lake was a 
potent political force who gave expression to the resentments of many 
white citizens. Pearsall later explained: "We didn't want Lake fired 
114 Dr. Beverly Lake Amplifies Upon Position Taken in Asheboro Speech, RALEIGH NEws & 
OBSERVER, July 20, 1955; HoDGES, supra note 73, at 84; John Batchelor, Rule of Law: North 
Carolina School Desegregation from Brown to Swann, 1954-1974, 178-85 (1992) (unpublished 
Ed. D. dissertation, North Carolina State University). 
Segregationists other than Lake also promoted the closure of the schools to avoid desegre-
gation. W.C. George, an anatomy professor at the University of North Carolina and later presi-
dent of the segregationist Patriots of North Carolina, argued that the preservation of racial 
purity required the abandonment of the public school system: "[W]e consider it more important 
... to preserve the white and Negro races than to maintain the public school system." Charles 
Dunn, An Exercise of Choice: North Carolina's Approach to the Segregation-Integration Crisis 
in Public Education 80-81 (1959) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina 
(Chapel Hill)). 
115 LUTHER HoDGES, Address on State-Wide Radio-Television Network (Aug. 8, 1955), in 
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 86, at 206. 
116 May 1956 Statement to Editorial Writers Conference, quoted in Confidential Memoran-
dum from Harry Golden to George Mitchell (May 23, 1956) (on file with the Kelly Miller Alex-
ander, Sr., Papers, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). Pearsall later 
commented: "The last thing we wanted was for someone to run [for Governor in 1956] on the 
race issue. That would force people to take positions and use rhetoric that we didn't want .... 
If segregation got in the race, Hodges would [have had to] become more radical." Lawyer Re-
calls 'Buying 1ime' for Integration, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976, at 1. A signifi-
cant portion of the electorate opposed pupil mixing and in much of the state segregation was 
potentially an explosive issue, particularly in eastern North Carolina. 
117 Hodges Defends Lake in Squabble, CHARLOTIE NEws, July 18, 1955. 
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because he would be a martyr and a symbol. He could probably have 
gotten elected governor, and a segregationist would have destroyed 
everything. "118 
Hodges's fears concerning Lake's political popularity were not 
unfounded. Lake was well known throughout the state and by 1955 
had emerged as the critical spokesman for the pro-segregation posi-
tion in the state. Although several of the state's newspapers attacked 
Lake as an extremist, particularly when he called for school closing 
legislation,119 Lake enjoyed considerable popular support.12° Ulti-
mately, Lake decided not to enter the 1956 gubernatorial race, but 
Hodges did have to fend off a primary challenge during which he was 
attacked for his "very lukewarm stand" on the desegregation issue.121 
In those same 1956 primaries, only one of the three North Carolina 
congressmen who had refused to sign the Southern Manifesto rebuk-
ing Brown won renomination in campaigns dominated by the "Mani-
festo issue"; the one survivor assured voters that notwithstanding his 
failure to sign the Manifesto, he favored the continuation of segre-
118 Lawyer Recalls 'Buying Time' for Integration, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976, 
at 1. 
119 Editorial-A New Voice for the Extremists, CHARLOTrE NEws, July 15, 1955, at 6A; Edito-
rial-Inciting the Extremists, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 15, 1955, at 4. 
120 Within weeks of Lake's address, over 300 North Carolinians established the Patriots of 
North Carolina, a statewide segregationist organization, and announced a plan seeking state 
support for private schools. Patriots of North Carolina to Promote Segregation Plan, RALEIGH 
NEws & OBSERVER, Aug. 23, 1955; Batchelor, supra note 114, at 188-91. Lake also began re-
ceiving hundreds of letters of support. Lawyer Recalls 'Buying Time' for Integration, RALEIGH 
NEws & OBSERVER, Nov. 7, 1976, at 1. Many North Carolinians signed petitions urging Lake to 
challenge Hodges in the 1956 Democratic primary for governor. Letter from Lunsford Crew to 
Luther Hodges (Jan. 30, 1956) (on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina 
State Archives, Raleigh, N.C.). Lake eventually entered the Democratic primary for governor in 
1960, capturing 44% of the vote. EARL BLACK, SoUTHERN GovERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: 
RACIAL SEGREGATION AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE IN THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 219 (1976). 
A survey of attitudes in 1955 toward desegregation in the Piedmont county of Guilford, 
home to the city of Greensboro, found that 43% of the white respondents favored closing the 
public schools in order to avoid desegregation and 56% of the white respondents favored with-
holding state funds from schools in order to prevent desegregation. MELVIN M. TUMIN, DESEG-
REGATION: RESISTANCE AND READINESS 34, 37, 45 (1958). Such strong anti-integration 
sentiment in one of the state's more racially moderate regions indicated the degree of support 
for segregation throughout the state. 
121 N.C. Court Upholds Pupil Assignment in Initial Test, S. ScH. NEws, Apr. 1956, at 11. Dur-
ing the campaign, certain conservative political leaders such as State Representative Byrd Sat-
terfield, who a year earlier had proposed the constitutional amendment abandoning the 
requirement of public schools, likened Hodges to the leaders of the NAACP in his support for 
school desegregation, an attack that could hardly have been more damning. Special Session of 
N.C. Legislature Predicted After Segregation Report, S. ScH. NEws, Jan. 1956, at 4. Satterfield 
later indicated that the only way to keep black children out of white schools was "to battle them 
at the doors." N.C. Governor, in Election Bid, Suggests New School Laws, S. ScH. NEws, Mar. 
1956, at 16. 
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gated schools.122 Hodges and the General Assembly well understood 
that segregation was a potent political issue in North Carolina in 1956. 
E. The Nature of North Carolina's "Moderation" 
As North Carolina's leaders debated the wisdom of the Pearsall 
Plan during the summer of 1956, participants on both sides in the de-
bate sought to characterize their views as the "moderate" position. To 
parry the efforts of those segregationists seeking more extreme action, 
the Pearsall Plan's proponents described the plan as a "moderate" 
step. State Senator Terry Sanford, one of the more progressive politi-
cians in the state and Hodges's successor as Governor in 1960, cham-
pioned the Pearsall Plan as advancing the cause of "moderation, unity, 
understanding, and good-will."123 William Joyner, Vice-Chair of the 
Pearsall Committee and a prominent North Carolina lawyer, pro-
moted the plan as "the moderate course."124 The state's leading news-
papers urged passage of the Pearsall Plan as a moderate response to 
the desegregation problem. The Greensboro Daily News, for exam-
ple, editorialized: "North Carolina wants no violence, and North Car-
olina wants no abandonment of its public school system. The path is 
tortuous and narrow. But with moderation, goodwill, understanding 
and wise, sound and far-seeing statesmanship we can and shall tread it 
safely."125 
Significantly, politicians who opposed the Pearsall Plan on the 
ground that it could undermine public education also claimed to rep-
resent the "moderate" course. Irving Carlyle, for example, one of the 
plan's chief opponents, urged North Carolinians to follow the route of 
"moderation and not one of extremism" and to defeat the plan.126 
That the politicians of the day would claim to represent the 
"moderate" position speaks much about North Carolina and its self-
perceptions during the 1950s. Throughout much of the South, those 
politicians who called unapologetically for defiant segregation were 
winning elections. Yet the rhythmic chants of segregationists such as 
122 Two N.C. Solons Losers on Issue of 'Manifesto', S. SCH. NEws, June 1956, at 8. 
123 Pearsall Plan: The Spirit of Moderation, GREENSBORO DAILY NEws, Sept. 2, 1956, at 6. 
See also Terry Sanford, Speech to Junior Women's Club (Aug. 20, 1956) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, 
N.C.) (urging a "spirit of moderation"). 
124 Pearsall Plan is Legal, Joyner Tells Assembly, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, July 26, 1956, 
at 1. 
125 Editorial-Saturday's Election, GREENSBORO DAILY NEws, Sept.10, 1956, at 6 (emphasis 
added}. 
126 Carlyle Calls for Defeat of Pearsall Group Plan, WINSTON-SALEM J., July 3, 1956, at 1. See 
also Letter from Irving Carlyle to Luther Hodges (July 5, 1956) (on file with Luther Hartwell 
Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh N.C.) (urging moderation). 
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Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver-"not one, no, not one"127-were 
not spoken by most North Carolinians who captured high political of-
fice. North Carolina politicians made competing claims of taking a 
"moderate" position on racial issues.12s 
William Chafe has aptly described the "civility" of much of the 
post-Brown debate in North Carolina over civil rights issues, where 
appearances of moderation often proved more important than reali-
ties.129 To be sure, most white North Carolinians were no different 
than their southern neighbors in their opposition to pupil mixing. 
Governor Hodges adamantly opposed pupil mixing, 130 pleading time 
and again with the state's black population to accept voluntary segre-
gation as a means of avoiding social strife. What distinguished 
Hodges and the majority of white politicians in North Carolina from 
their counterparts in many other southern states, however, was a rec-
ognition that more was at stake than merely preserving racial 
segregation. 
At an early date, much of the state's business and political leader-
ship recognized that defiant resistance to school desegregation, includ-
ing school closings, could potentially damage the state's economic 
future. As early as 1956, several prominent newspaper editors urged 
the state to adapt itself to school desegregation demands for economic 
reasons. Reed Sarratt, executive editor of the Winston-Salem Journal 
and Sentinel, noted that the state's failure to adapt to the Brown deci-
sion would cause "untold damage ... to our economy."131 C.A. Mc-
Knight, editor of the Charlotte Observer, made a similar claim.132 
Likewise, North Carolina Attorney General Malcolm Seawell told a 
127 Calvin Trillin, Remembrance of Moderates Past, THE NEw YoRKER, Mar. 21, 1977, at 85. 
Vandiver was governor of Georgia from 1959 until 1963. 
128 Appeals to "moderation" were made in other of the nondefiant states. In February 1956, 
for example, as much of the South debated interposition, the Memphis Commercial Appeal 
called for the formation of an organization of "moderates" to resist those "who might seek to 
impose radicalism of any sort on the rest of us." 'Moderation' is Key to North's Development in 
Tennessee, S. ScH. NEws, Mar. 1956, at 15. 
129 CHAFE, supra note 58. The discussion of school desegregation throughout the state during 
this time period bore the same quality. 
130 Hodges remained firmly committed to the principle of segregation throughout his tenure 
as Governor. As his administrative assistant Paul Johnston would explain to many constituents: 
"You may be assured ... that Governor Hodges will continue to do everything in his power to 
keep the races separated in all walks of life." Letter from Paul Johnston to Emma Byers (May 
29, 1956) (on file with Luther Hartwell Hodges Papers, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, 
N.C.). 
131 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, Voices of Moderation (July 1956) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 121-86, Atkins 
Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
132 Editor Sees Race Relations Hurt, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, Mar. 12, 1956, at SA. The 
Southern Regional Council by early 1956 called on chambers of commerce throughout the South 
to urge "sensible" solutions to the desegregation problem as a matter of "long-range economic 
benefit to the region." North Carolina Council on Human Relations, Integration Issue in the 
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group of bankers that although he objected to the Brown decision, 
defiance was inappropriate because of the social and economic havoc 
it could cause the state.133 The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on 
Human Relations circulated a speech delivered by the executive vice-
president of the Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce in 1956 in 
which he predicted the economic costs of resistance to Brown: "Boy-
cotts, economic reprisals, the possibility ·of abandoning our public 
schools, incidents of violence, irresponsible statements-these are 
new factors which will now be give consideration by industry and busi-
ness when they consider a Southern location."134 
By the late 1950s, business leaders throughout the South were 
well aware of the economic impact of defiant opposition to the Brown 
decision. The severe downturn in new business that accompanied the 
resistance to school desegregation in Little Rock was widely publi-
cizedP5 Likewise, Virginia, which adopted a statewide policy of mas-
sive resistance, experienced a sharp decline in new business growth. 
During the first three years of the 1950s, Virginia added approxi-
mately 31,000 manufacturing jobs per year; during the last three years 
of the 1950s, after implementation of the state's widely publicized pro-
gram of massive resistance, Virginia added approximately 5,000 new 
manufacturing jobs per year.136 Martin Gainsburgh, chief economist 
New York Tzmes, HuM. REL. BuLL., Mar. 1956, at 5 (on file with Frederick Douglass Alexander 
Papers, Box 121-86, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
133 Malcolm Seawell, North Carolina at a Crossroad, 14 NEw SoUTH 3 (1959). 
134 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations, Role of Business Leaders (1956) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 121-86, 
Special Collections, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte). The Southern 
Regional Council echoed a similar theme in 1956, calling on Chambers of Commerce throughout 
the South to urge "sensible" solutions to the desegregation problem as a matter of "long-range 
economic benefit to the region." ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 27, 1956, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 33. 
135 Both Arkansas in general and Little Rock in particular experienced a significant reduction 
in new business as a result of its staunch resistance to the integration of Central High School in 
1957. In 1958, Arkansas received only $25 million in new plant investment. In comparison, 
North Carolina received over 10 times that amount. Preston Holmes, Credit in the Development 
of the South, U. VA. NEWSL., Oct. 15,1959, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 
101, at 1. Indeed, in 1958 and 1959, no new industrial plants moved to Little Rock; over the 
prior eight years, an average of five new plants had located in the city each year bringing with 
them about 300 new jobs per year. NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, May 31, 1959, quoted in ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 11-12. One Little Rock bank executive commented: 
"I personally know of a firm employing several hundred people which had taken the preliminary 
steps to move to Little Rock. A poll of key employees led them to abandon the plan when wives 
of the executives feared that public school opportunities would be denied their children." ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 14. After the Little Rock school crisis of 1957-1958, 
two members of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce traveled throughout the South speaking 
about the impact of that city's racial problems on recruitment of new business. See CoBB, supra 
note 15, at 125. 
136 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 8. Other parts of the South would also 
experience downturns in business growth as a result of racial strife during the late 1950s and 
121 
HeinOnline -- 89 Nw. U. L. Rev.  122 1994-1995
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
for the National Industrial Conference Board, explained the economic 
impact of defiance: "[Businesses] eliminate from further considera-
tion areas which have this school problem, because of the friction in-
volved in them and the difficulty of getting top personnel to move to 
such places with their children. "137 
Governor Hodges, one of the region's most active gubernatorial 
business recruiters, was particularly sensitive to the impact of the re-
gion's racial problems on the recruitment of new capital. At least one 
company during Hodges's tenure as Governor expressly declined to 
locate in North Carolina because of the state's perceived racial 
problems.B8 Both Hodges and his successor in the Governor's man-
sion, Terry Sanford, aggressively used the state's reputation for racial 
moderation to recruit new industry.139 Both men recognized that 
overt resistance to the Brown decision could cause economic damage 
to the state. North Carolina's "moderation" ultimately produced tan-
gible economic benefits. Preston Holmes, a Richmond banker, con-
trasted North Carolina's "moderation" with Arkansas's defiance in a 
1959 article: "North Carolina, with legal compliance with the 
Supreme Court decision and little social unrest, had new plant invest-
ment in 1958 totaling $253 million, while Arkansas, with its massive 
resistance and unsettled conditions, had only $25.4 million in 1958 
compared with ... $131 million in 1956."140 
early 1960s. According to a representative of the state's Industrial and Agricultural Develop-
ment Commission, resistance to school desegregation in Nashville cost the state new capital. 
ATLANTA J.-CoNST., Mar. 30, 1958, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 6. 
As New Orleans engaged in massive resistance to prevent the admission of a handful of black 
children into white schools, a Tulane economist predicted that the defiance would cost the city 
millions of dollars per year as "[n]ational publicity about schools closing would strongly deter 
new industrial or business development from outside the state." ANn-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, 
supra note 101, at 18. In Birmingham, the violent resistance to the Freedom Riders in the spring 
of 1961 cost the city potential new capital in excess of $40 million, according to a Wall Street 
Journal report. Many Southerners Say Racial Tension Slows Area's Economic Gains, WALL ST. 
J., May 26, 1961, at 1. 
Moreover, in addition to the loss of new capital, many southern businessmen worried about 
the loss of an educated workforce in the wake of school closures. See, e.g., ATLANTA J., Jan. 20, 
1960, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 33. 
137 ATLANTA CoNST., Feb. 27, 1959, quoted in ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, 
at 33. To be sure, some observers have concluded that southern cities overestimated the impor-
tance to which industries that came South during the 1950s and 1960s attached to a city's race 
relations. See, e.g., James C. Cobb, Yesterday's Liberalism, in SOUTHERN BusiNESSMEN AND 
DESEGREGATION 166-67 (Elizabeth Jacoway & David R. Colburn eds., 1982); A. C. Flora, Indus-
trial Location in South Carolina, 10 Bus. & EcoN. REv. 1 (1964). Nevertheless, certainly the 
perception existed in the wake of the Little Rock experience that racial strife affected a city's 
ability to recruit new business. 
138 CoBB, supra note 15, at 123. 
139 !d. at 147. 
140 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 101, at 1. 
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There was a second reason for North Carolina's more moderate 
response to Brown. The state's political leaders understood that legis-
lative pronouncements and resolutions expressing defiance of Brown 
could lead to judicial intervention in the state's school system, result-
ing in even more widespread pupil mixing. Indeed, North Carolina's 
political leadership, while consenting to the school closing and tuition 
grant features of the Pearsall Plan, well understood that the plan must 
not operate as a device to maintain rigid segregation. As the state in 
the pre-Brown period had opened graduate programs for black stu-
dents, improved black teacher salaries, and increased expenditures for 
black schools in order to avoid judicial intervention,141 many North 
Carolinians now understood the need to engage in token desegrega-
tion to avoid judicial meddling in pupil assignments. 
In a widely publicized speech to the North Carolina State Bar in 
November 1956, two months after the enactment of the Pearsall Plan, 
William Joyner, the Vice-Chair of the Pearsall Committee and a dis-
tinguished Raleigh attorney, noted that several other southern states 
had vowed never to admit a black child to a white school. According 
to Joyner, those states would eventually face either the abandonment 
of public education or court-mandated integration; neither option was 
acceptable. Joyner, who described himself as a "man in the middle" 
on the desegregation issue, stated: 
[S]ome mixing in some of our schools is inevitable and must oc-
cur. . . . I do not hesitate to advance my personal opinion and it is that 
the admission of less than one percent, for example, one-tenth of one 
percent of Negro children to schools theretofore attended only by white 
children, is a small price to pay for the ability to keep the mixing within 
the bounds of reasonable control. ... 
One of the nightmares which besets me on a restless night is that I 
am in a Federal court attempting to defend a school board in its rejec-
tion of a transfer [to a white school] requested by a Negro student, when 
a showing is made in that court that nowhere in all of the State of North 
Carolina has a single Negro ever been admitted to any one of more than 
2,000 schools attended by white students.142 
Subsequently, Joyner told Kenneth Whitsett, Mecklenburg County 
head of a segregationist organization called the Patriots of North Car-
olina, that the "sacrifice of some children to mixed schools must be 
made so that many other children will not similarly be subjected to the 
evils of mixed schools."143 Joyner's comments reflected the pragma-
tism of white political leadership in North Carolina in the 1950s. 
141 See supra text accompanying notes 43-52. 
142 The Middle Road is Best, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, July 28, 1957, at 2B; 3 N.C. Cities Assign 
12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1957, at 3. 
143 SOUTHERN REGIONAL CoUNCIL, SPECIAL REPORT ON CHARLOITE, GREENSBORO, AND 
WINSTON-SALEM, NoRTH CAROLINA 2 (1957) (on file with the NAACP Papers, Box 111-A-105, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). Joyner made the comments in response to Whitsett's 
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Likewise, North Carolina was the only southern state to resist 
passing legislation inhibiting the activities of the NAACP. In May 
1957, the North Carolina General Assembly, prompted by Assistant 
Attorney General Lake, considered legislation to require the organi-
zation to disclose its membership lists and to prohibit the organization 
from paying litigation costs.144 In significant measure, the General 
Assembly rejected the proposed legislation because of fear of judicial 
intervention in the state's school desegregation efforts. State Repre-
sentative Frank Snepp of Charlotte, one of the primary opponents of 
the anti-NAACP legislation in the state House, argued that not only 
would the legislation cause "bitterness and disunity" and "open the 
way for economic reprisals" against NAACP members,145 it might also 
lead a federal court to scrutinize more closely the state's recently 
passed pupil assignment plan. Snepp claimed that the bill "is uncon-
opposition to the admission of four black students into three all-white senior and junior high 
schools in Charlotte. 
144 Governor Hodges, having been accused by his conservative critics of being unduly sympa-
thetic to the NAACP, threw his weight behind the proposal, arguing that the organization was an 
outsider interfering with North Carolina's efforts to work out its school problems. 9 Representa-
tives Would Tell NAACP to Bare Member List, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, May 7, 1957; 
Editorial-Unnecessary Law, AsHEVILLE CmzEN, May 11, 1957, at 4 (reprint of editorial from 
Winston-Salem J.); Administration Measures are Directed at NAACP, RALEIGH NEws & OB· 
SERVER, May 17, 1957, at 1. 
The NAACP had long been subject to vocal attack in North Carolina. Both Hodges and the 
Pearsall Committee on several occasions attacked the organization for its aggressive integration-
ist posture. Segregationist Beverly Lake was even more strident in his attacks on the organiza-
tion: 
The NAACP is our enemy, not the Negro people. We shall fight the NAACP county by 
county, city by city and, if need be, school by school and classroom by classroom to preserve 
our public schools .... 
It will be a bitter and costly fight. We can also make it a costly one for our enemies, 
both foreign and domestic. 
Wake County Takes Far-Reaching Step, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1955, at 3. Lake ultimately helped 
draft the anti-NAACP legislation, claiming that it would help prevent an "unspeakable trag-
edy"-amalgamation of the races. NAACP Head Says Bills Won't Stop Clamor for Equality, 
RALEIGH NEws & OBsERVER, May 29, 1957, at 3. 
The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP attempted to fend off the legislative efforts. 
State President Kelly Alexander, seeking to appeal to the anti-communist feelings of most North 
Carolinians, told the North Carolina General Assembly that his organization had fought against 
communism's "efforts to capitalize on the justifiable resentment Negroes feel against segregation 
and discrimination," and that the legislation threatened the state's "reputation for friendly race 
relations." Kelly Alexander, Statement of North Carolina State Conference of Branches, 
NAACP, to North Carolina General Assembly (May 28, 1957) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the NAACP Papers, Box III-A-279, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). Ultimately, 
the North Carolina General Assembly defeated the proposed legislation. 
In light of the defeat of the anti-NAACP legislation, the organization remained a viable 
force in North Carolina. The NAACP would enjoy much greater success in the 1960s. In 1963 
alone, 10 North Carolina school districts desegregated after initial pressure of one form or an-
other from the NAACP. NAACP, IN FREEDOM's VANGUARD: NAACP REPORT FOR 1963, at 9 
(1964). 
145 Racial Bill Approved by Group, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 6, 1957, at SA. 
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stitutional on its face . . . . [A ]ll we are doing is putting the State to a 
court test . . . . We've been fortunate in this matter, but if the federal 
court knocks this down it will set a pattern, our school laws on the 
subject would be in danger."146 Snepp had a keen sense of the 
broader picture. Taking retributive action against the NAACP could 
undermine the more important goal of fending off judicial interfer-
ence with the pupil assignment process. 
At the same time, others feared the legislation could damage the 
state's reputation for racial moderation, causing untoward economic 
consequences. In Charlotte, from which came many of the bill's most 
avid opponents, the Charlotte Observer claimed that the legislation 
would harm "North Carolina's good name as a progressive, enlight-
ened, fair state."147 To be sure, North Carolina's failure to take retrib-
utive action against the NAACP can be attributed in part to a less 
harsh racial environment within the state. Nevertheless, the desire of 
the state's political leaders to avoid both judicially-mandated pupil in-
tegration and damage to the state's economically beneficial moderate 
reputation on racial matters were critical factors as well. 
F. Reasons for North Carolina's Moderation 
Why did Hodges and the North Carolina "moderates" ultimately 
prevail over Lake and those North Carolinians calling for a more defi-
ant response to the Brown decision? Why did North Carolina not 
adopt the more extreme segregationist measures adopted in other 
southern states? The answer lies in large measure in two factors: the 
domination of North Carolina politics for much of this century by a 
business and financial elite committed to economic advancement and 
the avoidance of racial strife, and the relative political insignificance 
of the heavily black, rural counties of eastern North Carolina. 
Unlike many southern states, North Carolina, with a relatively 
small slave population, had no rural planter elite that dominated the 
state's politics during the antebellum or Reconstruction eras.148 In-
stead, a financial and business elite emerged in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as a "progressive plutocracy," which domi-
nated the state's politics for much of this century.149 This business 
146 NAACP North Carolina State Conference of Branches, Action Letter (June 1, 1957) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the NAACP Papers, Box III-A-279, Washington, D.C., Li-
brary of Congress); Anti-NAACP Bill In Trouble, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, May 31, 1957, 
atA3. 
147 Editorial-It is Not Worthy of this State, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 4, 1957, at 2C. 
148 Thad L. Beyle, The Paradox of North Carolina, in PoLITICS AND PoLICY IN NoRTH CARO-
LINA 4 (Thad L. Beyle & Merle Black eds., 1975). 
149 KEY, supra note 18, at 214. Following Key's 1948 classic work, Southern Politics in State 
and Nation, scholars have debated whether Key's characterization of North Carolina as "pro-
gressive" is accurate. See, e.g., LuEBKE, TAR HEEL POLITICS, supra note 16, at 1; Paul Luebke, 
Corporate Conservatism and Government Moderation in North Carolina, in 1 PERSPECDVES ON 
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elite committed itself to the aggressive promotion of industrial 
growth.150 Indeed, during the first half of this century, North Carolina 
enjoyed a substantially greater increase in its manufacturing activity 
than did any other southern state.t51 
North Carolina's business and political elite understood early on 
the .relationship between economic prosperity and positive race rela-
tions. Throughout the first half of this century, North Carolina's polit-
ical leaders, although unwavering proponents of racial separation, 
supported black education for reasons of paternalism and the poten-
tial economic benefits to the state. In 1902, Governor Charles Aycock 
and his allies helped defeat a proposed state constitutional amend-
ment that would have allowed the division of school monies based on 
the respective contributions of the two races, arguing in part that un-
derfinancing black schools might encourage black emigration from the 
state, thereby eliminating a necessary part of the workforce.152 Con-
cerns about black emigration were legitimate; in the wake of ratifica-
tion of an amendment to the North Carolina Constitution 
disfranchising black voters in 1900, large numbers of North Carolina 
blacks, including one retiring congressman, left the state in search of 
better opportunities in the North, creating labor shortages in some 
areas.153 Similarly, for most of the first half of this century, North 
Carolina maintained a smaller gap in per pupil expenditures for black 
and white children than did any other southern state and was the first 
THE AMERICAN SoUTH: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIETY, PoLmCS AND CULTURE 107 (Merle 
Black & John Shelton Reed eds., 1981); BAss & DEVRIES, supra note 74, at 229; Beyle, supra 
note 148, at 1; Preston W. Edsall & J. Oliver Williams, North Carolina: Bipartisan Paradox, in 
THE CHANGING PoLITICS oF THE SoUTH 366 (William C. Havard ed., 1972). Most would con-
cede, however, to the extent that "progressive" is defined in terms of promoting industrial ex-
pansion, the state has indeed been progressive for much of this century. Luebke, Corporative 
Conservatism and Government Moderation in North Carolina, supra, at 107-08. 
150 For example, North Carolina initiated one of the South's most aggressive highway build-
ing projects during the 1920s and spent a higher percentage of the state's wealth on public educa-
tion than virtually every other southern state. KEY, supra note 18, at 211; LuEBKE, TAR HEEL 
PoLITICS, supra note 16, at 9. As a result, by the middle of the twentieth century, North Carolina 
had one of the best road systems in the South and ranked fifth in the nation in the percentage of 
its income spent on public education. North Carolina: The Integration Issue, RALEIGH NEws & 
OBSERVER, Mar. 15, 1956. 
151 KEY, supra note 18, at 209-10. 
152 Lours R. HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PUBLIC ScHOOL CAMPAIGNS AND RACISM 
IN THE SOUTHERN SEABOARD STATES, 1901-1915, at 40 (1958); W.E.B. Du Bors & AUGUSTUS 
G. DILL, THE CoMMON ScHOOL AND THE NEGRO AMERICAN 50 {1911). To be sure, notwith-
standing the defeat of the constitutional amendment, black schools lagged far behind white 
schools in terms of per pupil expenditures due in large measure to the broad discretion local 
school boards exercised in the disbursement of educational monies. One 1909 study suggested 
that black schools in North Carolina received even less money than they would have under a 
separate taxation plan. CHARLES L. CooN, PUBLIC TAXATION AND NEGRO ScHOOLS 7-8 {1909). 
153 Janette Thomas Greenwood, Bittersweet Legacy: The Black and White "Better Classes" 
in Charlotte, North Carolina, 1850-1910, at 534-36 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Virginia). 
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southern state to provide graduate education programs for black stu-
dents.154 Moreover, repression of the black vote was less severe in 
North Carolina than in other southern states; for much of the pre-
Brown era, a higher percentage of blacks were registered to vote than 
in any other southern state. 
This racial paternalism may have been influenced by lawyers' tra-
ditionally dominant role in North Carolina's politics. For the first half 
of this century, every governor of North Carolina was a lawyer, as 
were large numbers of the state's leading legislators. These politician-
lawyers were particularly sensitive to threats of judicial intervention in 
the state's educational system.155 As a result, North Carolina re-
sponded more quickly than did most southern states to changing legal 
expectations pertaining to the financing of black education during the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, and pupil mixing in the 1950s.156 
North Carolina's racial "moderation" was also influenced by the 
fact that the majority black counties in eastern North Carolina did not 
exert the same degree of political influence as did similar "black belt" 
areas in other southern states. Political scientists have long recognized 
a correlation in southern voting patterns between areas of high black 
population and support for segregationist measures.157 In North Car-
olina, political power for most of this century has been linked to the 
business and financial interests of the state's central Piedmont section, 
as opposed to the rural farming areas of the state's eastern counties.158 
Moreover, a strong Democratic party organization for much of the 
first half of this century helped reduce the threat of extremists-on 
racial or other issues-seizing political power. This distribution of 
political power in North Carolina stands in sharp contrast to the more 
defiant southern states of the deep South or Virginia, where political 
power was far more likely to be linked to rural counties with high 
black populations.159 Indeed, North Carolina had a smaller black 
population than did most of the defiant states of the South and sub-
stantially fewer majority black counties. In 1950, for example, less 
154 See supra note 42. Governor Clyde Hoey supported the establishment of graduate pro-
grams for black students noting that "North Carolina does not believe in social equality between 
the races, but we do believe in equality of opportunity in their respective fields of service." 
CLYDE HoEY, ADDRESSES, LE:ITERS AND PAPERS OF CLYDE RoARK HoEY, GovERNOR OF 
NoRTH CAROLINA, 1937-1941, at 38 (David Corbitt ed., 1944). 
155 Edsall & Williams, supra note 149, at 371; Beyle, supra note 148, at 4. 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 43-52. Newspapers may have also played a role since 
many of the state's leading newspapers expressed views, particularly on matters of race, that 
tended to be more liberal than many of their southern counterparts. Beyle, supra note 148, at 3; 
JACK CLAIBORNE, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER: ITS TIME AND PLACE, 1869-1986 (1986). 
157 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 120, at 53, 67, 81, 94, 101, 114; KEY, supra note 18, at 229. 
158 KEY, supra note 18, at 217-18; Beyle, supra note 148, at 5. 
159 Moreover, legislative apportionment schemes favoring rural counties contributed to this 
domination by segregationist interests in other southern states until the 1960s when the Supreme 
Court struck down these schemes in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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than ten percent of the state's counties were majority black; each of 
the six most defiant southern states had a significantly higher percent-
age of majority black counties than did North Carolina.t6o 
Significantly, the only election in the post-Brown South in which 
a moderate segregationist defeated a militant segregationist in a head-
to-head primary election was the 1960 Democratic runoff primary for 
governor of North Carolina when Terry Sanford defeated Beverly 
Lake.161 Lake enjoyed strong support in the state's black belt coun-
ties, but Sanford's strong support in the Piedmont and the western 
section of the state allowed him to capture his party's nomination.162 
Sanford presented himself as a candidate who understood the neces-
sity of token integration in the service of larger interests: 
Nobody likes the Supreme Court decision and nobody intends to let the 
NAACP dominate North Carolina, but it is not going to serve any con-
structive purpose to keep saying this over and over. The more we stir it 
up, the harder it is going to be to keep the Supreme Court out of North 
Carolina's affairs. [Lake's] approach is leading us to closed schools or 
mixed schools, and we have got to stop his approach.163 
In a state where the preservation of racial separation at all costs was 
no longer the highest goal, Sanford captured well over half the votes 
cast.l64 
IV. THE RESULTS oF MoDERATION IN NoRTH CAROLINA 
A. North Carolina's Token Integration 
North Carolina's "moderate" response to Brown did not mean 
that black children were welcome in the state's white schools. Indeed, 
ten years after the Brown decision, less than one half of one percent of 
the schoolchildren in the state attended school with a child of another 
race. Other southern states that engaged in more strident resistance 
actually had more children attending integrated schools in 1964 than 
did North Carolina.165 How did North Carolina's course of "modera-
tion" result in the retention of segregated schools? 
160 AsHMORE, supra note 16, at 173-204. Even Virginia, which had a smaller black population 
than North Carolina on a statewide basis, had a substantially higher percentage of counties with 
a majority black population than did North Carolina. ld. These counties, most of which were 
located in southern Virginia, exercised substantial political power. 
161 BLACK, supra note 120, at 217-19. Lake did carry the black belt counties in eastern North 
Carolina and also did well among lower class whites in the Piedmont section of the state. Nu-
MAN V. BARTLEY & HUGH D. GRAHAM, SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUC-
TION 76 (1975). 
162 Although Sanford was clearly more racially moderate than Lake, he nevertheless made 
clear that he opposed "mixing the races in the schools." BLAcK, supra note 120, at 218. 
163 !d. 
164 Sanford captured 56% of the vote in the runoff against Lake and in November 1960 was 
elected governor. BLACK, supra note 120, at 219. 
165 See supra note 11. 
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In effect, North Carolina "succeeded" in retaining segregated 
schools because it understood that voluntary token desegregation and 
avoidance of statements of defiance would allow the state to continue 
with segregated schools without judicial interference. Following en-
actment of the 1955 pupil assignment statute that vested local school 
boards with the discretion to make pupil assignments on a nonracial 
basis, every North Carolina school board ostensibly abandoned race-
based school assignments.166 Yet in reality, most of the state's school 
boards would continue to assign children to school on the basis of 
their race until the mid-1960s.167 Black children who lived within 
walking distance of a white school were frequently assigned to a dis-
tant and inferior black school.168 In a few instances, where a school 
system provided schools only for white children, black children were 
required to travel by bus to schools in neighboring counties.169 
The pupil assignment statute did give black children the right to 
request a transfer to a white school and a number of black students 
initially assigned to black schools sought such transfers. However, 
none of the fifty black students who requested a transfer to a white 
school during the first two school years under the new placement stat-
ute was successful.170 Even counties that offered no education for 
166 Prior to Brown, every school district in North Carolina, as throughout the South, had 
assigned students to school based upon their race. Daniel J. Meador, The Constitution and the 
Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. REv. 517 {1959). 
167 A few North Carolina school districts began to assign students on the basis of geography 
rather than race in the early 1960s. For example, Chapel Hill did so in 1961. See infra note 191. 
Charlotte did likewise in 1962, although on a limited basis, with a plan that encompassed only a 
fraction of the school district's schools. 
168 Such was the case, for example, in Charlotte. Morrow v. Mecklenburg County Bd. of 
Educ., 195 F. Supp. 109 (W.D.N.C. 1961). 
169 Most typically this happened in the state's western counties with small black populations. 
Such children sometimes faced as much as an 80 mile round trip to school along narrow moun-
tain roads. Griffith v. Board of Educ. of Yancey County, 186 F. Supp. 511 (W.D.N.C. 1960). 
170 North carolina Advisory Committee, Equal Protection of the Law in Education in North 
Carolina {1960) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NAACP Papers, Box III-A-288, Li-
brary of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
The Wake County School Board did announce in August 1955 that beginning with the 1956-
1957 school year, race would no longer be a factor in school assignments. North Carolina's Wake 
County Takes Far-Reaching Step, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1955, at 3. Notwithstanding that pro-
nouncement, neither the Wake County nor any other North Carolina school board assigned a 
black student to a white school or granted a transfer request of a black student for the 1956-1957 
school year. 
Transfers were denied for a number of reasons. In one county, the request to transfer was 
denied because the black student had expressed a desire to transfer to a "white" school; the 
Board determined it could not make "assignments based on race" and denied the transfer. A.B. 
Cochran, Desegregating Public Education in North Carolina, in PoLmcs AND POLICY IN NoRTH 
CAROLINA 198, 200 {Thad L. Beyle & Merle Black eds., 1975). Other requests were denied 
because the black child requested any "desegregated school" instead of a specific school. Board 
Tells Parents of Negroes Why Reassignments Were Not Made, CHARLOITE OBSERVER, Aug. 20, 
1957, at 3A. 
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black children denied transfer requests.171 By the summer of 1957, no 
school board in North Carolina had ever assigned a black child to a 
white school and no school board had ever granted a black child's 
transfer request to attend a white school. 
In time, however, many North Carolinians argued that continued 
refusal to admit black students to white schools could leave the state's 
school systems exposed to judicial challenge.172 Accordingly, some of 
the state's political lea_ders, including Pearsall Committee Vice Chair 
Joyner, urged several of the state's local school boards to admit a few 
black students into white schools to demonstrate to the courts that 
North Carolina's pupil assignment system was not designed to pre-
serve segregated schools. Ultimately, three North Carolina school 
boards-Charlotte, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem-became 
among the first in the South to desegregate their schools voluntarily 
when they simultaneously announced in July 1957 that they had 
granted the transfer requests of twelve black students to white 
schools.173 That this early desegregation would come in these three 
cities was not surprising. Each was a Piedmont city, removed from the 
large black population of eastern North Carolina; each constituted 
one of the state's largest urban areas; and each had a thriving local 
economy. All of these conditions contributed to an environment 
where modest racial change was most likely.174 
In agreeing to voluntary desegregation in the summer of 1957, 
these three school boards operated with the understanding that their 
action would fend off more extensive court-ordered desegregation. 
The Charlotte School Board, for example, announced that in granting 
the transfers, it had acted to "preserve the public schools of Char-
lotte."175 Several of the state's newspapers argued that the token inte-
171 For example, black children in the mountain town of Bryson City sought to attend a local 
white school to avoid a 45 mile round trip to a black school in Sylva, located in a neighboring 
county. The request was denied. N.C. Pupil Assignment Faces Test, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, 
July 21, 1957, at 2D. 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 142-43. 
173 Beginning in 1955, the three school boards had met secretly to discuss the eventual deseg-
regation of their respective school systems. During the spring and summer of 1957, the three 
boards agreed to accept the transfer requests of a few black students to white schools for the 
1957-1958 school year. The three boards decided that each would announce on July 23 that the 
transfer requests of 12 black students in the three cities had been granted. Charlotte granted five 
of 45 transfer requests; Greensboro granted six of 13 transfer requests; Winston-Salem granted 
one of four transfer requests. 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S. 
ScH. NEws, Aug. 1957, at 3. 
174 See generally William Coogan, School Board Decisions on Desegregation in North Caro-
lina (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, l!niversity of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)) (analyz-
ing conditions under which desegregation more likely); Lamanna, supra note 77 (analyzing 
conditions favorable to desegregation). 
175 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1957, 
at 3. 
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gration would forestall widespread pupil mixing. The Charlotte News 
claimed that "the Charlotte City School Board has acted to preserve 
the schools. It has acted to prevent massive court-decreed integra-
tion."176 The Charlotte Observer described the voluntary desegrega-
tion as a "legal and effective instrument for keeping desegregation a 
limited and selective process" thereby avoiding "an inevitable court 
order for mandatory desegregation," and enhancing "the progressive 
tradition of the three communities and of this state."177 The Raleigh 
Times suggested that the three school boards' action "will make it pos-
sible for schools in areas where integration is surely not possible or 
even feasible to continue completely separate schools. This action has 
been taken for the benefit of the whole school system of the state, not 
just for the benefit of the 12 Negro children involved."178 
Many of the state's political leaders also hoped that the decision 
of the three boards would fend off broader, court-imposed desegrega-
tion orders.179 State Representative Edward Yarborough of Franklin 
County, Chair of the state House Education Committee and a mem-
ber of the Pearsall Committee, commended the three school boards 
for their decision: "I think it certainly strengthens our hands in the 
courts because it shows we have non-discriminatory laws, adminis-
tered by local boards. "180 
When schools opened in the fall of 1957, North Carolina was one 
of only four southern states, along with Arkansas, Texas and Tennes-
see, to admit black students into white schools.181 Moreover, the rela-
tively peaceful integration of the North Carolina schools stood in 
sharp contrast to that in Little Rock and won the state national and 
even worldwide acclaim. In the fall of 1957, for example, the Voice of 
America contrasted the North Carolina and Arkansas desegregation 
experiences, citing North Carolina as indicative of the real sentiment 
of the country.182 Over the next several years, a time when many 
176 Id. at 5. 
177 Editorial-Wisdom, Courage, and Law Dictate a School Decision, CHARLOTTE OB-
SERVER, July 24, 1957, at 2B. Fred Helms, a prominent Charlotte attorney and a member of the 
original Pearsall Committee, told a civic club audience that business and professional persons 
should lead the community in acceptance of desegregation. North Carolina's "course of moder-
ation" would succeed, urged Helms, whereas courts would strike down the more extreme school 
statutes in other states. State School Policy Hailed by Speaker, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 2, 
1957, at lB. Helms further noted that: "If the pupils in our schools and the great mass of moder-
ates can be left free from extremists, agitation, intolerance and prejudices, our problems will be 
reduced to a minimum." S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 1957, at 15. 
178 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, S. ScH. NEws, Aug. 1957, 
at 3. 
179 Integration Seen Bolstering Law, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 24, 1957, at 2A. 
180 3 N.C. Cities Assign 12 Negroes to Previously All-White Schools, supra note 178. 
181 SoUTHERN Eouc. REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 26. In addition to these four states, 
however, all of the border states had integrated at least some of their schools. Id. 
182 Marion Wright, Integration and Public Morals, NEw SoUTH, Nov. 1957, at 7. 
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southern cities reported downturns in business growth as a result of 
racial problems, chambers of commerce in the state's leading cities 
reported generous increases in new business.183 
The voluntary desegregation of these three school systems, how-
ever, did not bring broader desegregation to North Carolina. During 
the same summer that the three urban school boards granted the 
twelve transfer requests, the requests of almost two hundred other 
black students throughout the state, 184 even those living in counties 
with no black schools, were denied.185 Moreover, even in the three 
desegregated school systems, the degree of desegregation did not in-
crease during the next few years; by the spring of 1959, fewer black 
students were attending white schools in North Carolina than in Sep-
tember 1957.186 Indeed, by 1960, no school board in North Carolina 
183 See, e.g., Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, CHARLOTIE (Jan. 1962, Jan. 1963, Aug. 1963) 
(on file with the Frederick Douglass Alexander Papers, Box 114A-l, Atkins Library, University 
of North Carolina at Charlotte). 
184 Throughout the state, 184 requests for transfers by black students were denied during the 
summer of 1957. North Carolina Advisory Committee, supra note 170. See, e.g., 66 School Ap-
plications Rejected, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Aug. 6, 1957, at lB; Larry Jinks, Students May Ask 
for Reassignment, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Aug. 3, 1957, at lB. 
185 All-White School Eyed by Negroes, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, July 10, 1957, at 6A. In coun-
ties that had no black schools, black children were transported to schools in neighboring 
counties. 
186 For example, the following year, the Charlotte School Board assigned no additional black 
students to a white school and approved only two out of 23 transfer requests filed by black 
students; once again, only four black students attended a white school in Charlotte that year. In 
1959, the Charlotte School Board denied every transfer request, continuing its policy of denying 
all transfer requests of black students who lived closer to their assigned black school than to the 
desired white school. Only one black student attended a white school in Charlotte during the 
1959-1960 school year, three fewer than two years earlier. Three Localities Begin Desegregation; 
Total Now Stands at Seven, S. ScH. NEws, Sept. 1959, at 10. 
Greensboro, one of the other North Carolina cities to desegregate in 1957, was also slow to 
expand from the initial token desegregation. In 1963, six years after the first desegregation, only 
19 black children attended white schools in Greensboro and all of these were in the same school. 
CHAFE, supra note 58, at 151-52. 
Finally, during the 1959-60 school year, school boards outside of the original three cities 
granted transfer requests of black students for the first time: Durham, High Point, Wayne 
County, and Craven County. The Wayne County and Craven County school systems were the 
sites of major military installations and the desegregation in those counties took place at schools 
attended primarily by the children of military personnel, many of whom were non-southerners. 
Indeed, a school at the Fort Bragg military installation operated by the federal government had 
been desegregated in 1951. JEFFREY J. CROW ET AL., A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN 
NORTH CAROLINA 167 (1992); AsHMORE, supra note 16. More black students in those two 
school systems attended white schools in 1959-60 than in all other school systems in the state 
combined. American Friends Service Committee, Newsletter (Oct. 1959) (on file with the North 
Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)); North Carolina Advisory 
Committee, Equal Protection of the Laws (1960) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
NAACP Papers, Box 111-A-288, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
By 1960, six years after the Brown decision, only 34 of over 300,000 black students in North 
Carolina attended school with white children and these 34-all of whom had to file a transfer 
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had ever initially assigned a black student to a white school and most 
of the hundreds of transfer requests filed by black students had been 
denied.187 At the same time, no court had ever found a North Caro-
lina school system to be unconstitutionally segregated188 even though 
the NAACP initiated more school desegregation litigation in North 
Carolina during the 1950s than in any other southern statets9 and a 
few courts had found unlawful school segregation in other southern 
states.190 The obvious fact that every North Carolina school board 
was continuing to maintain a dual assignment system by initially· as-
signing children only to schools of their own race went uncorrected by 
the courts until the early 1960s.191 Token integration, unaccompanied 
by defiant rhetoric, enabled the state to escape judicial intervention in 
a manner that other, more defiant southern states did not.192 North 
Carolina's policy of moderation stood vindicated. 
request-were located in only 7 of the state's 174 school districts. SoUTHERN Eouc. REPORTING 
SERV., supra note 7, at 28. 
187 Guy Munger, Integration Held Slow in N.C., GREENSBORO DAILY NEws, Oct. 2, 1960, at 
1. Moreover, almost half the total number of transfer requests that had been granted were in 
Wayne and Craven Counties and involved primarily the children of non-southern military per-
sonnel. North Carolina Advisory Committee, supra note 170. 
188 Both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit found the North Carolina assignment plan to be constitutional as written. The 
Fourth Circuit found the plan facially constitutional, leaving open the question of whether it 
would be applied by local school boards in a constitutional manner. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 
724, 728 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957). The North Carolina Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the statute, as well, noting that: 
nothing in the Brown case requires that children of different races be taught in the same 
schools. The doctrine therein declared, to be put into effect in specific cases 'with deliberate 
speed' as conditions may warrant, is that no child, whatever his race, may be excluded from 
attending the school of his choice solely on the basis of race. 
Constantian v. Anson County, 93 S.E.2d 163, 167 (N.C. 1956). 
Indeed, no North Carolina court ruled in favor of black students seeking admission to a 
white school until1960 and then only for a handful of children in Yancey County who had been 
required to make an 80 mile trip on mountain roads to attend a black school in a neighboring 
county. Griffith v. Board of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 511 (W.D.N.C. 1960). 
189 Pete Gilpin, N.C. Leads South in Desegregation Cases Pending or Proposed, NAACP Told 
Here, AsHEVILLE CmzEN, Oct. 10, 1959, at 10. 
190 See supra note 12. 
191 In 1961, a court in a North Carolina school desegregation case found for the first time that 
a black child had been denied assignment to a white school because of his race. Vickers v. 
Chapel Hill City Bd. of Educ., 196 F. Supp. 97, 101 (M.D.N.C. 1961). Although not required to 
do so by the court order, the Chapel Hill Board of Education responded by becoming the first 
school district in the South to adopt a plan of assigning black students to school on a geographic 
rather than racial basis, which resulted in several black students attending a majority white 
school. Davis B. Young, Historic Integration Plan Adopted for Chapel Hill School District, 
CHAPEL HILL WKLY., July 6, 1961, at 1. Nevertheless, the Chapel Hill school district, home to 
the University of North Carolina, was unusually liberal relative to much of the state. 
192 The state's cynical manipulation of moderation did not escape the notice of the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Council on Human Relations: "[I]t seems increasingly clear that initial token de-
segregation, rather than paving the way for future compliance, is becoming a means of evasion of 
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B. Why North Carolina's Token Integration Succeeded 
But if the Brown decision declared segregated education uncon-
stitutional, why did the lower courts in North Carolina, charged with 
carrying out the Brown mandate, refuse to require school boards to 
cease race-based pupil assignments and to grant the transfer requests 
of black students? The reasons are essentially threefold: the failure 
of the Supreme Court to insist on meaningful desegregation, the 
dearth of plaintiffs ready to challenge segregation practices, and the 
willingness of the lower courts to conclude that token integration and 
the absence of statements of defiance indicated that the state was op-
erating its schools in a nondiscriminatory manner. 
First, the Supreme Court failed to give lower court judges de-
tailed guidance in enforcing the Brown mandate. Although the sec-
ond Brown decision in 1955 concerned itself in large measure with the 
issue of enforcement, the decision offered little in terms of specific 
direction. In a statement that offered great comfort to southerners 
intent on resisting compliance, the Court noted: "Full implementation 
of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local 
school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility 
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems .... "193 Signifi-
cantly, the Court did not impose any timetable on desegregation ef-
forts, rejecting the Justice Department's proposed ninety-day 
timetable for the submission of desegregation plans.194 The Court in-
stead merely indicated that school boards should make a "good faith" 
start toward desegregation and should proceed "with all deliberate 
speed." Not surprisingly, the second Brown decision was greeted with 
relief throughout the South.195 
Furthermore, following the second Brown decision, the Supreme 
Court largely abandoned the school desegregation field for the next 
several years, seriously undermining compliance efforts.196 Between 
1955 and 1960, the Supreme Court issued only one full opinion in a 
public school desegregation case-in the crisis situation of Little 
Rock197-and a few other per curiam decisions and affirmances.198 
the law." Charlotte-Mecklenburg Council for Human Relations, School Board Must Move To-
ward Full Compliance, NEw SoUTH, Dec. 1959, at 11. 
193 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955). 
194 Brief of the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief, Brown v. 
Board of Education, in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, at 768. 
195 WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 64. 
196 Admittedly, during this time period the Court was active in striking down state-supported 
segregation in a broad range of public facilities. See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) 
(buses); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); 
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) 
(public golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches). 
197 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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For the most part, the Court's decisions came in extraordinary cases 
where the very authority of the federal courts was challenged and 
Supreme Court intervention demanded. Otherwise, the Court re-
mained silent on a large number of issues concerning school desegre-
gation, such as the need for plaintiffs to exhaust administrative 
remedies before seeking judicial relief and the validity of one-grade-
per-year desegregation plans, notwithstanding widely divergent deci-
sions in the lower courts on these and other issues.199 In cases where 
the Court did speak, it reaffirmed the general principles of Brown, but 
declined to offer specific guidance to lower courts on how to enforce 
198 Besides the full opinion in Cooper, the Court issued five per curiam decisions between 
1955 and 1960 in school desegregation cases. 1\vo were earlier procedural decisions in the 
Cooper case. Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.S. 566 (1958) (refusing to stay district court order prior to 
consideration by court of appeals); Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (announcing decision in Cooper 
pending later full opinion). 1\vo were per curiam affirmances of three-judge court decisions 
declaring unconstitutional certain state statutes that interfered with school desegregation. 
United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 500 (1960) (per curiam) (affirming lower court decision 
striking down a Louisiana statute which asserted that Supreme Court decisions in school segre-
gation cases were a usurpation of state power); Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959) (per 
curiam) (affirming lower court decision striking down an Arkansas statute giving the Governor 
the authority to close schools that were scheduled for desegregation). Finally, the Court af-
firmed a three-judge court's determination that the Alabama pupil placement statute was consti-
tutional on its face. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958) (per 
curiam). 
At the same time, between 1956 and 1958, the Court denied certiorari in at least a dozen 
school desegregation cases. Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil Disso-
nance, 11 YALE LJ. 1520, 1524 n.10 (1968). 
199 On at least three occasions, the Court declined to review conflicting lower court decisions 
regarding the constitutionality of a one-year-at-a-time desegregation plan. In two of the cases, 
the lower court approved of such a plan, while a third court disapproved. Kelley v. Board of 
Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959) (approves); Slade v. Board of 
Educ., 252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958) (approves); Evans v. Ennis, 281 
F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961) (disapproves). 
Likewise, the Court denied review in two cases in which lower courts had differed on the 
need for desegregation plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The Fifth 
Circuit held that exhaustion of state remedies was not required before initiating litigation. See, 
e.g., Mannings v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 277 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1960). The Fourth Circuit 
disagreed. Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Holt 
v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959). Not until 
1963 did the Supreme Court consider the exhaustion of remedies issue and hold that exhaustion 
of state remedies was not a prerequisite to a suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief in a 
school desegregation case. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). 
Finally, the Court failed to resolve the split in the lower courts on the permissibility of 
allowing transfers from a school where a student was in a racial minority to one where a student 
was in a racial majority. The Sixth Circuit permitted such transfers, Kelley v. Board of Educ., 
270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959), but the Fifth Circuit did not. Boson v. 
Rippy, 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960). 
On occasion, some justices tried to have the Court consider additional school cases, but 
without success. See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Educ., 361 U.S. 924 (1959) (Justices Warren, Doug-
las, and Brennan dissenting from. denial of certiorari in case in which lower court approved a 
plan allowing minority to majority transfers). 
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its mandate. Calls for the high Court to offer more guidance to lower 
courts went unheeded.2oo 
The Supreme Court had initiated a "second reconstruction" with 
the Brown decision, but had left it to southern federal judges to super-
vise the accompanying social revolution with little guidance or sup-
port. The failure of the Court to at least reconcile conflicting lower 
court opinions, if not offer further guidance as to what Brown re-
quired, made the job of the federal district court judge charged with 
the responsibility of overseeing desegregation decrees all the more 
difficult.201 As a consequence, in the face of considerable local pres-
sure from segregationists,Z02 many state and federal judges simply re-
fused to order school boards to desegregate their schools. 
The second reason for the dearth of successful school desegrega-
tion lawsuits in North Carolina during the first decade after Brown 
was the difficulty in bringing such litigation. Many black parents did 
not wish to send their children to white schools because of fears of 
mistreatment and hence had no interest in litigation seeking to force 
such admission. Moreover, several of the black parents who did sign 
petitions asking for desegregation or file lawsuits in the early years 
after Brown were subjected to harassment or some type of retaliation 
that discouraged further litigation.203 The difficult transfer procedures 
that the courts obliged black students challenging their pupil assign-
ments to follow, coupled with the substantial expense and expertise 
required to support litigation, made it virtually impossible to mount a 
200 See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 4, at 209 ("It will be beneficial if the Court gives a new and 
unified sense of direction to the lower judges, and it will, incidentally, also be helpful if the Court 
exerts itself to keep the few opposition judges in line."). 
This reluctance continued in the 1960s. The Court issued only two full opinions in southern 
school desegregation cases from 1960 to 1964, one in the exceptional Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, school closing case, Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and the other one 
striking down minority-to-majority transfer provisions that gave students the right to leave a 
desegregated school, but no corresponding right to enter one. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 
683 (1963). The Court did issue per curiam opinions in a few other cases, most of which per-
tained to the fierce resistance to school desegregation attempts in Louisiana. See, e.g., Calhoun 
v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964); St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd. v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1962); City of 
New Orleans v. Bush, 366 U.S. 212 (1961); Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569, aff'd 
sub nom. City of New Orleans v. Bush, 366 U.S. 212 (1961). 
201 See generally PELTASON, supra note 107; JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC 
STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME 
CouRT's BROWN DECISION INTO A REvoLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981). 
202 See PELTASON, supra note 107, for discussion of pressure on southern judges to resist 
implementation of the Brown decision. 
203 See, e.g., Letter from L.R. McKnight to Kelly Alexander (Sept. 14, 1954) (on file with the 
Kelly Miller Alexander, Sr. Papers, Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte); 
Minutes, N.A.A.C.P. Board of Directors, Nov. 9, 1959 (on file with the NAACP Papers, Box III-
A-279, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) (NAACP offers financial assistance to black par-
ent who faced foreclosure in retaliation for his request for a transfer of his children to a white 
school); Lamanna, supra note 77, at 57. 
136 
HeinOnline -- 89 Nw. U. L. Rev.  137 1994-1995
89:92 (1994) Desegregating the South 
successful legal challenge to a pupil assignment without some type of 
organizational support. Moreover, until the 1964 Civil Rights Act au-
thorized the Justice Department to file school desegregation suits, the 
NAACP was the only organization committed to challenging school 
segregation through litigation.204 Even though the North Carolina 
General Assembly ultimately declined to enact anti-NAACP legisla-
tion, the attacks on the organization and its members in North Caro-
lina restricted its effectiveness and undermined the willingness of 
black plaintiffs to step forward and pursue legal remedies.205 By 1960, 
the NAACP had managed to bring only eleven school desegregation 
lawsuits in the entire state of North Carolina.206 
The final reason why North Carolina's "moderate" response to 
the Brown decision survived judicial challenge until the 1960s was the 
ability of local school boards to utilize both the complicated transfer 
process and the few instances of token integration to deflect claims 
that the state still maintained a dual school system. The North Caro-
lina courts established early on that black plaintiffs seeking assign-
ments to white schools would be entitled to no judicial relief unless 
they went through the detailed transfer and administrative appeal pro-
cess established by the state pupil assignment statute.2o7 This exhaus-
tion requirement proved to be a major hurdle; virtually every judicial 
204 And yet the NAACP was under constant attack in the South throughout the 1950s as the 
organization faced a region-wide campaign to crush it. The more typical elements of the struggle 
were legislative attempts to require the organization to disclose its membership lists and to pre-
vent the organization from financing litigation. WASBY ET AL., supra note 8, at 181-92; Murphy, 
supra note 98. Although virtually all of this legislation was eventually declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court, the legislation effectively ended NAACP activity for a few years in much 
of the South, particularly in Alabama. Southern NAACP membership declined by almost 40% 
between 1955 and 1957. ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: 
BLACK CoMMUNmES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 33 (1984); NAACP, PROGRESS AND 
PoRTENTS: NAACP ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1958, at 5 (1958). 
205 Moreover, the organization experienced other forms of harassment in the state. Shortly 
after the second Brown decision in 1955, a white segregationist group, the Patriots of North 
Carolina, filed charges with the Secretary of State's office alleging that the organization had 
failed to register with the state as an out-of-state organization seeking to influence public policy; 
the organization ultimately agreed to pay a $500 fine for failure to register. State NAACP Unit 
Failed to Register, Eure is Informed, DuRHAM MoRNING HERALD, Nov. 15, 1955, at 10; $500 
Check Paid State by NAACP, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Apr. 2, 1957, at 1. 
206 See supra note 189. 
207 For example, in Carson v. Board of Educ., 227 F.2d 789,790 (4th Cir. 1955), the Fourth 
Circuit held that "[w]here the state law provides adequate administrative procedure for the pro-
tection of such rights, the federal courts manifestly should not interfere with the operation of the 
schools until such administrative procedure has been exhausted and the intervention of the fed-
eral courts is shown to be necessary." See also Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 727 (4th Cir. 
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Covington v. Edwards, 165 F. Supp. 957, 959 (M.D.N.C. 
1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1960); Holt v. Raleigh City 
Bd. of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853, 862 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
361 U.S. 818 (1959); Joyner v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ., 92 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. 1956); Con-
stantian v. Anson County, 93 S.E.2d 163 (N.C. 1956). 
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challenge to school segregation considered by a North Carolina state 
or federal court during the 1950s was ultimately dismissed on the 
grounds that the plaintiff had failed in some manner to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies.208 At the same time, the fact that such trans-
fers were possible and that a few black students did actually receive 
transfers enabled the courts to conclude that the North Carolina as-
signment plan passed constitutional muster, despite the fact that every 
school child in North Carolina was still assigned to school on the basis 
of race.209 Thus, by 1960, no North Carolina federal or state court had 
ever ruled in favor of a black plaintiff in a school desegregation 
case.210 By the same token, courts during the 1950s struck down pupil 
assignment practices in other southern states that had excluded all 
black children from white schools as part of a well-orchestrated strat-
egy of massive resistance, and ordered black students admitted into 
208 The United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded in a 1962 study that the princi-
pal obstacle to desegregation in the South was the requirement that black plaintiffs adhere to the 
complicated administrative processes contained in the pupil placement statutes, UNITED STATES 
CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 15. 
209 Significantly, shortly after the three North Carolina school systems opened in the fall of 
1957 with limited desegregation, a three-judge court in Alabama considered the constitutionality 
of the Alabama pupil placement statute. Pursuant to that statute, no black child had ever been 
assigned to a white school, but the state argued that such assignments were certainly possible. In 
upholding the constitutionality of the Alabama statute as written, the court noted that the North 
Carolina placement statute, similar to the Alabama one, had resulted in admission of black stu-
dents to white schools. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372, 381-82 
(N.D. Ala. 1958). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court's decision. 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 385 U.S. 101 (1958) (per curiam). 
In denying black plaintiffs a right to attend a white school, the courts relied in large measure 
on an early and important gloss on the Brown decision from one of the South's most distin-
guished judges-John Parker of Charlotte. Parker had served more than 30 years on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and had been nominated for a seat on the United 
States Supreme Court by Herbert Hoover. Parker, in language that was seized upon throughout 
the South as casting an important limitation on Brown, wrote the following in 1955: 
[The Supreme Court] has not decided that the states must mix persons of different races in 
the schools or must require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the right of 
choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided, and all it has decided, is that a state 
may not deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it main-
tains . . . . The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids 
discrimination. 
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (emphasis added). Parker's dicta would 
be cited again and again throughout both North Carolina and the South for the next decade as 
legitimating assignment plans pursuant to which no black child was ever assigned to a white 
school. 
210 There had, however, been a number of attempts to desegregate the schools in North Caro-
lina, all of which the courts rejected. See, e.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 727 {4th Cir. 
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Covington v. Edwards, 165 F. Supp. 957 (M.D.N.C. 
1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 780 {4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959); Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of 
Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 265 F.2d 95 {4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 
(1959); Joyner v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ., 92 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. 1956); Constantian v. 
Anson County, 93 S.E.2d 163 {N.C. 1956). 
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white schools.211 North Carolina, which studiously avoided pro-
nouncements of defiance in conjunction with well-publicized acts of 
token integration, had demonstrated that a carefully orchestrated pol-
icy of "moderation" could well serve both the cause of segregation as 
well as the state's economic interests. 
V. CoNcLusioN 
The South successfully resisted meaningful implementation of the 
Brown decision until the mid-1960s.212 Most southern states did so in 
dramatic fashion, publicly pledging with great fanfare to resist all at-
tempts to force pupil mixing on an unwilling region. Yet a few south-
ern states like North Carolina assumed a posture of "moderation" in 
the wake of the Brown decision, motivated by a desire to preserve the 
economic benefits of a progressive reputation on matters of race and 
to prevent extensive court-ordered desegregation. 
Ultimately, this policy of moderation succeeded. Lower courts 
throughout the 1950s refused to strike down North Carolina's pupil 
placement system notwithstanding the fact that virtually no black chil-
dren ever won entry into a white school. North Carolina's perceived 
willingness to comply with the Brown decision allowed the state to 
mask its own form of resistance, which, though not as dramatic as that 
of its southern neighbors, was equally effective. By the end of the first 
decade after Brown, the schools of North Carolina were no more inte-
grated than those of the more defiant southern states.213 Neverthe-
less, North Carolina had managed to preserve its moderate racial 
image and was enjoying the benefits of that image in terms of in-
creased new business. In a region historically beset with profound iro-
nies when it came to matters of race, this result could not have been 
surprising. 
211 For example, in January 1957, a federal judge in Norfolk declared the Virginia pupil place-
ment statute-pursuant to which no black student had ever entered a white school-unconstitu-
tional, a decision that the Fourth Circuit affirmed a few months later. Adkins v. School Bd. of 
Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
855 (1957). Similar actions were taken in Louisiana and Arkansas. See United States v. Louisi-
ana, 364 U.S. 500 (1960) (per curiam); Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959). 
212 Efforts to increase southern school desegregation received an enormous boost when Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI of that statute provided that no recipient of 
federal funds could discriminate on the basis of race. As a result, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) began an extensive effort to compel southern school districts to 
end their segregative practices in exchange for the continued receipt of federal funds. The 
amount of school desegregation in the 11 states of the old Confederacy dramatically increased 
after 1964 in response to HEW pressure. See generally GARY 0RFJELD, THE REcoNSTRUCTION 
OF SoUTIIERN EDUCATION (1969); James R. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegre-
gation in the South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42 (1967). 
213 Similarly, the schools of the other moderate states of Tennessee and Texas were still al-
most completely segregated by the tenth anniversary of the Brown decision. SoUTIIERN Eouc. 
REPORTING SERV., supra note 7, at 29. 
139 
